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This study is about the intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa. The primary
objective is to review the international experience offiscal decentralisation with the view
to providing answers to the issue of revenue sharing, problems of expenditure and
revenue assignment, and the impact of the whole decentralization on the size of the
public sector in South Africa.
Methodology
The methodology adopted in this study includes (1) a review and comparison of the
practise offiscal decentralisation in four countries, and (2) an econometric investigation
into the impact offiscal decentralisation on the size ofthe public sector, using time series
quarterly data for the period 1993/94 to the second quarter of 1998/99. Regarding the
econometric investigation, a single linear regression model including fiscal
decentralisation, fiscal collusion, income and population are assumed to influence the
size ofthe public sector.
Study Findings
Our analysis provides certain interesting results. First, the countries reviewed tend to
ass~gn functions in a manner that is consistent with the public finance theory that
functions that are distributive in nature and those that are meant to ensure the country's
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stability should be reserved exclusively for the federal or national government. Whereas
the Australian, Canadian and Brazilian's revenue decentralization show a number of
significant taxes that are devolved to the lower levels ofgovernment, Germany represents
a strong collection at the center. The discrepancy is compensated for by the use of
equalization grants in the German model.
Second, fiscal decentralisation is found to exert a negative influence on the size of
the public sector, although the impact is statistically not significant. The insignificance of
the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the size of the public sector is explained in terms
of the fact that there has, in fact, been very little decentralisation in South Africa. The
size of the provincial and local government own source revenue relative to the
consolidated general government expenditure is very little, pointing to the serious lack of
revenue raising powers by the sub-national governments and thus the absence of any
meaningful extent ofdecentralisation.
Third fiscal-collusion exerts a significant negative influence on the size of the
public sector. That is, the size of the public sector will reduce if provinces and local
authorities are granted enough power to raise their own revenues. This result indicates
that the massive transfers of revenue from the national government to the provinces and
local authorities (revenue sharing) significantly reinforces the expanding influence of the
decentralised expenditures fmanced through revenue transfers.
Fourth, the overall size ofthe country's population is found to be inversely related
to the size of the public sector supporting the argument that as population increases,




Governments' roles in democratic societies are to serve their citizens by providing a stable socio-
economic environment and public goods and services desired by the society. There are countless
ways in which this can be achieved. That is, policy makers or governments have the choice ofa
great number of instruments, and the combinations chosen give rise to different fiscal systems.
The implications ofthe particular fiscal system chosen, however, will depend upon the features of
the economy ofthe country concerned, such as the extent ofdevelopment ofthe economy, extent
of decentralization of government functions, degree of homogeneity of the population, and the
extent ofgovernment intervention in the economy (Brown and Jackson, 1990).
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa establishes a federal fiscal system in
which the three spheres of government viz. national, provincial and local governments, are
distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. The Constitution also identifies functional areas of
concurrent and exclusive competence for the three levels ofgovernment. Three issues ofserious
concern and fundamental to the effective intergovernmental fiscal relations have, however,
emerged. These issues require careful study and wider debate and consultation in order to arrive
at consensus decisions on them (Government of South Africa, 1996).
The first major issue relates to the revenue sharing process between the three spheres of
government. The national Constitution requires that nationally raised revenues be divided
equitably between the three spheres ofgovernment, and that the provincial share be sub-divided ~
equitably between the nine provinces. In addition to their equitable shares, provinces and local
government also receive grants from the national share.
A provincial formula allocates funds between provinces according to their demographic
and economic dynamics, taking account ofthe services for which the provinces are responsible. A
local government formula has also been designed to enable municipalities to deliver a package of
basic services to low income households at affordable cost. Both formulae have strong equity
component, recognising the special needs ofpoorer areas (Department ofFinance [DoF], 1998).
The equitable division of national revenues between the three spheres of government
provides each with the funds to provide the services and perform the functions assigned to it
under the Constitution, given each sphere ofgovernments' ability to raise its own revenue to pay
for these activities. Many questions have been raised, in particular, about the provincial revenue
formula that has been developed by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). Among these
concerns are (1) issu(fs relating to the variables in the formula, how they were derived and
questions of their credibility; (2) unreliability of the base period figures used in the provincial
revenue sharing; (3) rationale behind the phasing-in of the formula over a five-year period; (4)
treatment ofconditional grants; and (5) treatment ofsub-national borrowing powers (FFC, 1995a:
1995b: 1996).
The second major issue relates to the assignment of revenue responsibilities to the sub-
national levels ofgovernment. Revenue sharing is necessitated by the constitutional assignment of
revenue-raising and expenditure responsibility. Most or almost all ofthe revenues in the country .
are raised nationally, and although the provinces have significant expenditure responsibilities, they
have only limited revenue sources. Since the revenue sources assigned to the provinces simply
cannot finance the level of expected local activity, the result of the expenditure devolution
downwards is likely to be a strong demand for increased, rather than reduced, transfers.
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Unfortunately, there has not been any concrete empirical estimates of"correspondence" between
expenditure and tax assignments and the need for transfers. The intergovernmental fiscal relations
has been developed with no quantitative assessment of its implications on the size of the
government or on the economy as a whole.
The national government accepts that expenditure responsibilities should in principle be
matched by taxation powers, however, the potentially disruptive effects that sub-national taxation
powers may have on national macroeconomic policies seem to put the national government in a
very reluctant position to decentralize revenue powers. Instead, the national government has
instructed the Katz Commission which has been set up to inquire into certain aspects of the
country's tax structure to submit proposals on the tax powers ofprovinces to enable legislation
regarding provincial taxation powers, as required by the Constitution (Department of Finance
DoF,1998).
The third important issue relates to the demands that the new fiscal and financial
arrangement places on the subnational governments. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act,~ )
which took effect from January 1998, establishes a formal process for considering
intergovernmental budgetary issues. The Act has been designed to facilitate and regulate a process
ofconsultation to promote a fair and transparent budget-making process. The Act therefore gives
effect to section 214 ofthe Constitution by setting out the process to arrive at the equitable share
of revenues raised nationally. As expected, the new intergovernmental budgeting system has
thrown up new challenges and problems. These include the development of an information and
reporting system to promote effective financial management, coordination of budgeting and
policy-making, and the need to build capacity, particularly at the sub-national levels of
government.
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The first question that arises when it comes to fiscal decentralization is what kind oftasks
should be assigned to subnational governments and which should be retained at the central level.
Closely linked to this issue is the crucial question of how the different tasks of lower levels of
governments - once identified and defined - should be assigned to different lower levels of
government (Brown and Jackson, 1990). This is one ofthe key issues in the policy discussion on
this topic in South Africa. It also constitutes an area where lack of a clearly defined and
communicated policy has led to inefficient systems in a number ofcountries. In other words, it is
extremely important that the assignment of tasks to different levels of government is carefully
thought out, and once the allocation oftasks has been decided upon, that it be kept as stable as
possible. Once the basic structural issues have been decided upon, the question ofhow to design
an efficient financing system, including the issue of the system oftaxation, arises. The design of
the tax systems required to streamline revenue mobilisation will need to take account of the
revenue needs ofthe lower levels ofgovernment. This will naturally put constraints on the types
oftax systems which are both feasible and desirable (Prud'homme, 1994).
1.2 The objective
This study is about the intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa. The specific objective is
to examine the practice and circumstances in industrialized countries, where federal systems of
economic decision making have evolved over a longer period oftime, with the view to searching
for clues or answers to the issue of revenue sharing mechanisms, problems of expenditure and




Many studies have attempted to test the Leviathan hypothesis that fiscal decentralization serves as
a constraint on the behaviour ofrevenue-maximizing government and thereby restrains the overall
size ofthe public sector (see, for example, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Gates, 1985; Marlow,
1988; Grossman, 1992; and Kneebone, 1992). A problem with all ofthese studies is that they treat
fiscal decentralization as devolvement of either taxing or spending powers, neglecting the
inseparability oftaxing and spending decisions. This study supports Bird and Wallich (1993) and
argues that fiscal decentralization in the Leviathan model of government is a composite,
constitutional action containing the two inseparable elements of taxing and spending decisions.
Accordingly, this study will test the hypothesis that: "a simultaneous decentralization ofnational
government's taxing and spending powers tends to act as a constraining influence on the overall
size of the public sector".
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation comprises six chapters. Chapter two contains the review of the
theoretical aspects of fiscal decentralisation. In chapter three we examine the practice and
problems of fiscal decentralization in selected developed and developing countries. In Chapter
four we review the experience and issues offiscal federalism in South Africa. In chapter five we
review the empirical tests ofthe fiscal decentralisation hypothesis. In chapter six we specify and
estimate the Leviathan model to test the impact offiscal decentralization on the size ofthe public
sector. The model estimates and discussions on them are also covered in this chapter. Chapter
seven concludes the study with policy recommendations.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Aspects of Fiscal Decentralization
2.1 Defmition of Fiscal Decentralization
Fiscal decentralization or fiscal federalism is concerned with economic decision making in federal
systems of government, i.e., in systems of government in which public sector decisions can be
taken at various levels of government (Shah, 1994).
Brown and Jackson (1990) argue that a decentralized government is one for which a
number of small autonomous governments join together to form a federation of states or
governments. A central or federal government usually exists to co-ordinate the activities ofthe
smaller local governments. The local governments, however, have autonomy to determine their
own levels of public outputs and their own mix of taxes and tax rates. The degree of
centralization varies with the amount ofautonomy that local governments have.over expenditure
and tax decisions.
The overriding issue in fiscal decentralization is the assignment problem, i.e., the
assignment of expenditure, taxation and regulatory responsibilities to various levels of
government. The key issue here concerns the optimal degree ofdecentralization ofpublic sector
decisions ofdifferent sorts. The assignment function is, ofcourse, conditional on the sorts ofroles
undertaken by the public sector and also on the objectives ofgovernment intervention in economic
activity (prud'homme, 1994; Bird, 1993; Oates, 1985 as well as Broadway, Roberts and Shah,
1994a).
According to McLure (1993), the division offunctions and tax bases among the various
levels of sub-national government depends upon the geographic extent ofbenefits, economies of
scale of production and administration, decision making costs, the mobility of taxpayers and
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recipients ofbenefits ofpublic services, and the advantages ofvote trading in expressing intensity
offeeling. Decentralization can take varying forms, ranging from assigning exclusivejurisdictions
for a given function to a given level ofgovernment to situations of co-occupied jurisdictions in
which one level of government is able to influence the decisions taken by another in varying
degrees through mechanisms such as regulation, the power to override decisions or financial
intervention. To some extent, the amount of decentralization on the expenditure side can be
determined independently of that on the tax side.
Silverman (1992) views decentralisation in a less institutionalised way. He defines five
types ofdecentralization namely, deconcentration, delegation and devolution. The other two are
the ''top-down''and the ''bottom-up''system.
In a deconcentration system, selected functions are assigned to sub-national units within
sector ministries or other sector specific national agencies. One can visualize the deconcentrated
institutional arrangements in terms of a 'branch office' system. In this type of decentralization,
local governments do not exist as discrete entities with respect to the functions for "\:Vhich central
government ministries are responsible. Thus, with respect to those functions, government exists
at local levels in the form ofdiscrete ministry offices without any mechanism at the local level for
mandatory horizontal integration.
Delegation is the form of decentralization that takes place when parastatals and other
semi-autonomous government agencies are assigned responsibility for implementing or
maintaining sector investments. In a minority ofcases, decentralized organisational arrangements
within sectors are of a purely devolved type.
Devolution o:f, at least, some functions is found primarily in the urban development sector
and with respect to operations and maintenance. The essence of devolution is discretionary
authority. To the extent that local governments have discretionary authority, they can do
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essentially what they decide to do, 1?ound only by broad national policy guidelines, their own
financial, human, and material capacities; and the physical environment within which they must
operate. An essential characteristic of discretionary authority is that the supervisory role of
central government is limited to ensuring that local governments operate within very broad
national guidelines with respect to the functions they are expected to perform. The exercise of
effective discretion by local governments, however, depends on their ability to generate the
financial and staff resources to implement the decisions that they make.
In the "top-down system" local governments exercise responsibility on behalfofcentral
governments or parastatals. When acting as agents under such systems, local governments do so
under supervision from central governments. Under the "bottom-up system", various levels of
government parastatals act as agents ofgovernment or government parastatals act as agents of
beneficiaries/users/clients. Thus a system ofbottom up principal agency is significantly different
from the top-down version in terms ofthe source ofdiscretionary authority to initiate contracts
with government agencies and supervise their own implementation.
Silverman (1992) also suggests a sixth type ofdecentralization, which he calls the 'hybrid
decentralization'. The hybrid decentralization is where the system-wide institutional arrangements
is characterized by the coexistence ofelements ofat least four ofthe five forms ofdecentralization
discussed earlier together with other higWy centralized government functions. According to
Silverman, within the hybrid systems, some functions are decentralized in one way and other
functions are decentralized in other ways. At the macro institutional level, all decentralized
systems can be expected to be hybrid. Decentralized systems at the comprehensive sectorallevel
are most often hybrid.
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2.2 Rationale for Fiscal Decentralization
According to Norregaard (1995) the basic economic rationale for decentralization is the potential
efficiency gain which follows from the possible differentiation ofthe provision ofpublic goods and
services in different locations in accordance with the tastes ofthe local population. Thus, through
decentralization, a "market" is established for local public goods, which entails a welfare gain
compared to a situation with only one homogenous level of services throughout the economy.
Norregaard's views corroborate those expressed by Oates (1972) when he said that not all
public goods have similar spatial characteristics. Therefore a 'one size-size-fits-all' approach does
not deliver supply ofpublic goods that is optimal for all citizens. Oates contends that when the
jurisdiction that determines the level ofprovision ofeach public good includes precisely the set of
individuals who consume the good, there is perfect correspondence in the provision of public
goods. One would therefore need a highly decentralized public sector with many sub-national
jurisdictions ofvarying sizes. Each level ofgovernment possessing complete knowledge ofthe
tastes ofits constituencies and seeking to maximise their welfare, would provide Pareto-efficient
level of output and would finance this through benefit pricing. It can be concluded from the
above, that centralization is costly ifit leads the government to provide a bundle ofpublic goods
different from the preferences of the citizens ofparticular regions, provinces, or municipalities.
According to Cremer, Estache, and Seabright (1994), each type ofpublic good should be
provided by a level of government enjoying a comparative advantage in accounting for the
diversity ofpreferences in its choice ofservice delivery. Not only that but, there should be enough
welfare gains to justify the devolution to the next level ofgovernment.
Theoretically the welfare loss in the central production of each public good should be
measured before devolution decisions are made. The extent ofthe welfare loss depends upon the
degree ofhomogeneity ofindividual preferences. Highly heterogeneous groups will suffer welfare
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losses from a centralized solution. Further, the size of the loss in consumer surplus varies
inversely with the price elasticity of demand. Also, if there are economies of scale in the
production of the good, then the unit cost for larger communities will be lower than for smaller
groups. Thus the extent of the welfare loss depends upon the the distribution of preferences
throughout the community, the elasticity of demand and the existence of economies of scale
(Dates,1985).
According to Tanzi (1995), the theoretical efficiency gains from decentralization can be
significantly undermined in practice by institutional constraints. Ter-Minassian (1997) advances
three reasons that contribute to the undermining of efficiency gains in decentralized systems.
First, the administrative capacity of sub-national governments may be quite weak. Overstaffing,
poor technical skills and training of employees, and the inability to formulate and implement
effective spending programs to fully exploit potential financing sources are some of the
weaknesses that characterize many regional and local jurisdictions in a number of countries
worldwide. The incidence ofcOl1llption at the local level is not negligible. Second, subnatio~al
governments often have not been able to develop modem transparent public expenditure
management systems, including adequate mechanisms for financial control, reporting accounting,
and evaluation of expenditure programs. Third, the size of local jurisdictions as a result of
historical imperatives, is not always consistent with the full realization ofpotential efficiency gains
from decentralization. It has also been held that - even in cases where the economic conditions
for decentralization may not be evident - it will promote local democracy and thereby contribute
to democratization of society.
According to Tanzi (1995) there can be a political argument for decentralization if a
country is not homogeneous and if ethnic, racial, cultural, linguistic, or other relevant
characteristics are regionally distributed. Russia and Ethopia are good examples of such
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countries. South Africa before 1994 was largely the same although demographic profiles are
changing with the newly found mobility of people. Decentralization may be needed to induce
various regions to remain part of the federation and as a goal of national unity to push non-
democratic governments toward the forced elimination of regional differences. In democratic
societies the economic and political arguments for decentralization tend to converge, since it is
argued that decentralization strengthens democracy. Most people are more inclined to engage in
local political activities because local policies have a more direct impact on their daily lives
(Brown and Jackson, 1990).
Decentralization has also been held to enhance macroeconomic performance by reducing
growth of public expenditure and mobilizing local financial resources for development (Shah,
1991). According to Ter-Minassian (1997), the proponents ofcentralization argue that allocative
considerations may come into conflict with distributional and macroeconomic manCilgement
objectives. Especially in large countries characterized by subnational regional disparities in the
distribution of productive resources and incomes, the ability of subnational governments to
provide public goods and services to their residents can vary widely, leading to undesirable
internal migrations as well as unsustainable social and political pressures. This sometimes results
in the provision of sub-standard levels of certain public goods, such as poor primary education
and basic health care which adversely affect the stock of human capital ofthe country. This in
turn may have a negative impact on the prospects for long-term growth of the economy.
On the other side, the argument by the proponents ofcentralizationdoes not imply that the
provision of public goods and services other than those of a clearly national nature should be
administered centrally. The central government can influence the delivery ofpublic goods through
setting of policy guidelines or mandates. Central government could transfer resources to sub-
national governments to equalize their capacity to meet mandates and exercise ex post control
11
over the use of transfers and the level of quality of services provided by the lower levels of
government (Ter Minassian, 1997).
An important consideration in the macroeconomics ofdecentralization is that even ifthe
overall level of expenditure of sub-national governments is sufficiently constrained by limits on
their taxation and borrowing powers, changes in the composition oftheir expenditures can affect
aggregate demand in a way which may run counter to the stabilization objectives of the central
government. Even a balanced budget expansion by sub-national governments could boost
aggregate demand, and worsen the balance of payments, if the average expenditure multiplier
significantly exceeds that ofrevenue. From a macroeconomic management perspective therefore,
central governments should retain responsibility for expenditures that have a particularly strong
impact on demand or that are particularly sensitive to changes in the cycle. Further, the greater
the share of public expenditure that is assigned to the sub-national levels of government, the
greater the need to involve the latter in the pursuit of any needed fiscal adjustment.
According to Shah (1994), the economic framework developed in the fiscal federalism
literature addresses the question of the appropriate level of centralization by assigning taxing,
spending and regulatory responsibility to various levels ofgovernment. This framework argues
for the assignment of a responsibility to the lowest level of government that can internalize
benefits and costs ofdecision making for the specific service.
However, according to Prud'homme (1994), recent discussions on the appropriate level of
decentralization offiscal expenditure have largely been theoretical or anecdotal. Huther and Shah
(1998) have developed an index for the quality ofgovernance for a sample of80 countries. They
apply the index to the debate on the appropriate level of fiscal decentralization.
Governance is & multi-faceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of
authority through formal and informal institutions in the management ofthe resource endowment
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of a state. The quality ofgovernance is thus determined by the impact ofthis exercise ofpower
on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens (Huther and Shah ,1998)
In measuring quality of governance, Huther and Shah (1998), develop indices for the
government's ability to (1) ensure political transparency and a voice for all the citizens (2) provide
effective public services efficiently (3) promote the health and well-being of its citizens and (4)
create a favorable climate for stable economic growth. These factors are among those cited in the
World Bank's (1992) booklet, Governance and Development as represen~ing the most important
goals that ought to be faced by governments. All governments can be expected to pursue these
goals regardless of their country's wealth. Huther and Shah (1998) conclude that the
decentralization side ofthis debate cites efficiency gains due to greater voice for local constituents
while the centralized side cites efficiency gains from economies ofscale often from consolidating
human or physical capital. The conclusion ofthe value ofgreater decentralization was informed
by examining the relationship of fiscal decentralization to various individual and composite
measures of quality ofgovernance. At an empirical level, it appears that governance quality may
be enhanced by greater decentralization.
2.3 Assignment of Responsibilities
The answer to the question of what kind of functions should be assigned to sub-national
governments and which should be retained by the central government is closely related to the
Musgrave classification of public tasks. According to Musgrave (1959), distribution functions
should be assigned only to the central government because people bearing the burden of
distributional policies might migrate and thus render local distributional policies ineffective. The
central government should also be largely responsible for stabilisation policies because of spill-
over effects and because sub-national governments do not usually possess the necessary arsenal of
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policy measures, such as monetary policy instruments. Finally, the allocation function should be
the core function of sub-national governments since their prime task is to provide public goods
and services to the local population in accordance with the preferences ofthis population and with
the financing burden borne by them.
From Musgrave's general principles, the preferred assignment of expenditure
responsibilities have been developed in the public finance literature. That is, sub-national
governments should be responsible for the delivery of public services that have a direct linkage
with communities served by sub-national governments and the national government for
expenditures clearly national in nature, such as defence, foreign affairs, international trade,
immigration, etc. For stabilisation purposes, the central government should assume responsibility
for the central bank and the currency. For the lower levels of government, there is a lack of a
clearly defined and communicated policy. However, following the principle ofbenefit areas, local
governments should provide services, the benefits ofwhich accrue to the local population which
should bear the major part of the economic burden associated with the provision of the service
(Shah, 1991; Bird and Wallich, 1993).
It can be concluded from the above that a given service should be provided by the level of
government that most closely represents the region that benefits from such a service on the one
hand. On the other hand national public goods such as national defence, macroeconomic stability
and redistribution, require centralized administration and centralized policy.
According to Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero (1997), most goods that governments supply
do not fit neatly into either of these two categories. For these mixed goods some degree of
decentralization coupled with some centralized co-ordination of policy is both feasible and
desirable, owing to unclear benefit regions, externalities, economies of scale, or national
redistributional implications. For instance, there are certain efficiency advantages to local supply
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of primary education and preventive health care, such as possibly better quality through local
supervision, and allowance for communities to express cultural and curative preferences. For
tertiary education and hospitals, existence ofeconomies ofscale and externalities imply that more
centralized control may be warranted. This, however, points to the demand for minimum
standards that often require centralized decision making and control.
Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero (1997) also point out that, the control ofoverall expenditure
levels is important in a successful macroeconomic strategy. This control is not contingent upon
the actual administration of expenditure functions by the central government, but rather on the
adoption within a system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, of financing mechanisms that
provide appropriate incentives for control. It is also the case that decentralized administrations
with poorly defined policy goals and lax financing mechanisms invariably leads to a loss of
macroeconomic control.
The question of how to design an efficient financing system, including the issue of the
system oftaxation has been widely discussed in literature. (McLure, 1993; Broadway, Roberts
and Shah, 1994a: 1994b). Consensus seems to suggest that t~e design ofthe tax systems required
to streamline revenue mobilisation will need to take account of the revenue needs of the lower
levels ofgovernment. This will naturally put constraints on the types oftax systems that are both
feasible and desirable. The important issues that arises include:
* major economic principles and practical guidelines for tax assignment; and
* tax types to be assigned to Provincial and Local Governments.
In dealing with the issues raised above, the experiences ofcountries where federal fiscal
arrangements have evolved over a long period oftime is very important. Although the practices in
these countries differ because of the different institutional, political, and geographical
circumstances, there are a number ofeconomic principles oftaxation in a federal setting that have
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been developed and which can be applied to any federal fiscal economy. Their implications for any
given country, however, will depend upon the features ofthe economy ofthe country concerned,
such as the extent ofdecentralization offunctions, the degree of heterogeneity ofthe population,
and the extent ofgovernment intervention in the economy (McLure, 1993; Broadway, Roberts
and Shah, 1994a; 1994b).
According to Broadway, Roberts and Shah (1994a: 1994b), Bird and Wallich (1993), the
assignment oftaxes by jurisdiction depends partly on the mix ofvarious taxes used in the country
overall. In Public Finance theory, the issue of an ideal tax mix has not been widely developed.
Governments almost universally employ balanced tax systems, which have the feature that
different taxes apply to basically the same bases. For example, general sales taxes, payroll taxes,
and income taxes have bases that overlap considerably. From the point ofview ofefficiency and
equity, one should be able to make do with a single general tax base, yet no government behaves
this way. The usual reason given for this behaviour is that administrative considerations play an
important role. A mix oftaxes enables the rate on anyone tax to be kept low, thereby reducing
the incentive to evade or avoid the tax. In addition, by using a mix oftaxes, taxpayers who would
otherwise be able to avoid taxation ofone type are caught in the net ofanother, making the tax
system fairer. The importance ofthe various taxes in the overall mix remains, however, a matter
ofjudgement rather than something that can be deduced from the principles.
The arguments advanced above also apply in the case oftax assignment to sub-national
governments. Efficiency and equity arguments have to be tempered by administrative
considerations, and the exact assignment depends upon informed judgement. Four major
economic principles, however, come into play in deciding which taxes to assign to lower levels of
government. These include efficiency in the internal common market, national equity, fiscal need
and administrative costs (costs ofcompliance and collection). The internal common market will
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be functioning efficiently ifall resources, i.e., labour, capital, goods and service are free to move
from one region to the other without impediments or distortions imposed by policy.
Decentralized tax systems can interfere with the efficiency ofthe domestic market. For instance,
uncoordinated setting oftaxes is likely to lead to distortions in markets for resources which are
tradable goods. This problem can be lessened if sub-national governments recognize that
resources are mobile. However, ifthey do recognize this, they may engage in socially wastefull
beggar-thy-neighbour policies. This may lead to inefficiently low taxes and high subsidies if all
jurisdictions engage in such policies (Bird and Wallich, 1993).
The arguments for making equity a federal objective is that all persons ought to enter into
society's 'social welfare function' on an equal basis, and presumably that the central government
is a level that can ensure that residents in different jurisdictions are treated equitably. To the
extent that equity is viewed as a national objective, decentralized taxes can interfere with the
achievement of those objectives (Shah, 1991).
To ensure accountability, revenue means should be matched as closely as possible to
revenue needs. Thus tax instruments intended to further specific policy objectives should be
assigned to the level of government having the responsibility for such a service. In this sense
progressive redistributive taxes, stabilization instruments, and resource rent taxes would be
suitably assigned to sub-national governments (Kusi and McGrath, 1994).
The decentralization of revenue raising can also serve to increase the costs ofcollection
and compliance, both for the public sector and the private sector. There are fixed costs associated
with the collection of any tax, which will have to be borne for each tax type that is used by the
sub-national governments. Taxpayers will also have to incur costs of compliance for all taxes
levied. The possibilities for evasion and avoidance will increase with decentralization for some
types oftaxes. This will be true where the tax base is mobile or where the tax base straddles more
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than one jurisdiction.
Tax harmonization and co-ordination are important objectives for tax policy. They
contribute to the efficiency of the internal common market, reduce collection and compliance
costs and help to achieve national standards of equity. Tax harmonization may be horizontal as
well as vertical. In the case of tax bases jointly occupied by the national government and sub-
national governments, harmonization can be achieved without sacrificing sub-national fiscal
responsibility by having a single centralized collection procedure combined with the ability ofthe
sub-national governments to decide on their own rate structures. They may also be required to
abide by the national rate structure and only be allowed to choose their own rate levels and
possible schedules ofcredits. Fiscal responsibility requires that at least sub-national governments
are able to set their own rate levels.
2.4 Intergovernmental Transfers
Central-provincial fiscal relations consist primarily ofa set offinancial transfers from the
J federal government to the states and a set ofarrangements for co-ordinating and sharing particular
bases. There may also be interactions among governments through regulations. In principle, the
two levels ofgovernment could be financially independent and separate. However, typically this is
c- - -
not the case. The federal government will collect more tax revenues than it needs for its own
purposes and transfer some ofthem to the states either as grants or by an explicit sharing oftax
revenues. This outcome reflects the fact that, while it may be efficient to decentralize expenditure
responsibilities to a considerable extent, it is more efficient to centralize tax collections (Ehdaie,
1994). Moreover, in a decentralized federation, there is a need for federal-state transfers in order
to allow the federal government to fulfill its national efficiency and equity objectives (Shah, 1991).




may be conditional or unconditional. A conditional grant is offered to be spent for a particular
purpose. The conditions may be general, in the sense ofbeing related to spending in broad areas,
or they may be specific and require a provincial expenditure programme to satisfy certain design
features (e.g., a particular highway).
According to Broadway, Roberts and Shah (1994b), the use of conditional grants
constitutes one of the main ways in which the federal government can influence the states to
exercise their expenditure responsibilities in a way which is consistent with national efficiency and
equity objectives. The full amount offunds transferred for a particular purpose may be contingent
on sub-national expenditures fulfilling certain conditions laid down by the federal government.
The conditions may be quite general and indeed should be as unconstraining as is possible,
consistent with the objectives being addressed.
While the magnitude of conditional grants is related to expenditures of a given sort by
each recipient state or sub-national government, unconditional grants can be determined by a
variety of factors. Two sorts offactors are relevant:
those determining the allocation ofgrants across states or sub-national government, and
those determining their growth rate over time
The simplest allocation formula is an equal per capita grant, in which case population is
the sole determinant. Other factors commonly used include average incomes, tax capacity (i.e., the
size ofparticular tax bases), tax effort, urbanization, age structure ofthe population, andm~
of the cost of providing particular state public services or rate o{growth ofGDP, the rate of
growth ofprovincial expenditures ofparticular sorts, or other such indices ofgrowth (Shah, 1991;
Ehdaie, 1994; FFC, 1995).
Revenue sharing mechanisms are frequently used to address fiscal imbalances or a
mismatch of revenue means and expenditure needs arising from the assignment of taxes and
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expenditures to different levels ofgovernment. Tax sharing formulas can take a variety offorms.
They can be highly centralized with the federal government determining the base and rate
structure for particular tax source, collecting the tax, and turning over to the state in accordance
with the state in which the tax was collected (the derivation principle) or other formulas similar to
those outlined for unconditional grants (Ehdaie, 1994).
Decisions concerning the tax structure ofjointly occupied tax bases can be decentralized in
a variety ofways. The tax base determination can rest with the federal government and states can
levy supplementary (piggyback) rates on the same base. The states could also be allowed to
choose a rate oftax to apply to federal taxes payable, with the federal government retaining the
rights to set the rate structure and base to administer the tax. Or the states may accept the base
used by federal government and set its own rate structure, including both tax credits and tax
brackets. The states may participate in the administration of the tax jointly with the federal
government, especially the auditing of state taxpayers. At the extreme, the states and federal
government may act independently to set their own tax structures and collect their own taxes for
the same tax. Thus, the spectrum can go from fully harmonised joint taxes to completely
unharmonised taxes.(Oates, 1969).
2.5 Summary
Three important issues emanate from the discussion in this chapter. First, it is apparent that fiscal
decentralization can take varying forms. These would range from assigning exclusivejurisdictions
for a given function to a given level of government to situations of co-occupied jurisdictions in
which one level of government is able to influence the decisions taken by another in varying
degrees through mechanisms such as regulation, the power to override decisions or financial
intervention. To some extent, the amount of decentralization on the expenditure side can be
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determined independently ofthat on the tax side. It is also clear that the general trend is that of
decentralizing expenditure simultaneously with revenue decentralization.
Second the rational for decentralization is that at an empirical level, it appears that the
quality ofgovernance may enhanced by greater decentralization.
Third, that a given service should be provided by the level ofgovernment that most closely
represents the region that benefits from such a service and that national public goods such as
national defence, macroeconomic stability and redistribution, require centralized administration
and centralized policy. Also to ensure accountability revenue means should be matched as closely
as possible to revenue needs. Thus tax instruments intended to further specific policy objectives
should be assigned to the level ofgovernment having the responsibility for such a service.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Federalism: International Experience
3.1 The Structure of Government
In this section we review the structure ofthe federal system ofgovernment in Australia, Canada,
Germany and Brazil. These countries were selected because oftheir federal nature and they are in
different stages of development. The Australian federation comprises of the Commonwealth
Government plus six state governments and two mainland self-governing territories. Over and
above this are 900 local government bodies (Table 3.1). The Constitution gives no formal
recognition to the role oflocal government, and this level falls under the state legislative control.
The Constitution underpinning the Australian federation defines relatively few exclusive
powers, such as the levying of customs and excise duty, for the central government. The
Constitution also prescribes a number of powers that the Commonwealth can exercise
concurrently with the states and in which its laws would prevail in the event ofa conflict. These
powers include defence, foreign affairs, taxation, social welfare benefits and pensions, post and
communications, currency and banking, and insurance. Section 96 ofthe Australian Constitution
gives the Commonwealth parliament the power to make grants on terms and conditions as it sees
fit.
This is the power that the Commonwealth has used to influence expenditure patterns of
sub-national governments, administrative priorities and macroeconomic stabilization policy. The
six member states retain for themselves residual and exclusive legislative responsibility for a
Ilumber of service areas, including law and order, education, health, housing and urban
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Table 3 1 STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
COUNTRY COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT
AUSTRALIA Commonwealth (Central Government) Plus Six Original Colonial State
Governments; 900 Local Government Bodies That Have No Formal
Constitutional Role.
CANADA Federal Government, 10 Provinces, 2 Territories And Nearly 5 000 Local
Governments
GERMANY Federal Government, 16 Lander (States) And A Local Government Which
Is Not Significant
BRAZIL The Union, 26 States And About 5 000 Municipalities Of Varying Sizes
(Important Level In This Country)
Source: Compiled from Huter and Shah, (1998)
development, road and rail transport, gas and water and the provision of electricity. In
addition to these, the national and sub-national governments operate public enterprises, (Craig,
1997).
The Brazilian federation comprises ofthree levels ofgovernment, namely the Union, 26 states,
plus the Federal District and about 5 000 municipalities ofwide ranging sizes (Table 3.1).
The Canadian federation is made up of the federal government and 10 Provinces, 2
territories as well as 5 000 local authorities (Table 3.1). The Canadian federal government is
given responsibility for the national public debt and property, regulation oftrade and commerce,
defense, money and banking, criminal law, raising of money by any type of taxation, and the
authority to legislate in any areas not explicitly allocated to the provinces.(Broadway and Hobson,
1993). The British North America Act of 1867 give provincial legislatures the exclusive right to
make laws within the province in areas that are generally local or private in nature, such as
property and civil rights, public institutions, education, the management and sale ofpublic lands,
and the administration ofjustice. Provincial government activities can be financed through the
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provincial right to use direct taxation. Provincial activities can also be financed by the "spending
power" of the federal government. This power allows the federal government to make
expenditures usually through transfers for functions under provincial jurisdictions. Local
governments receive their powers and responsibilities from the provincial legislatures and all
provinces have devolved to local governments the responsibility for primary and secondary
education and welfare.
Bird (1990) points out that, public sector financing in Canada is unique because it is one of
the most decentralized federations with respect to federal-provincial arrangements and one ofthe
most centralized with respect to provincial-municipal arrangements. Similar to the Australian
system, the Canadian model recognizes the federal and provincial levels of government.
According to Leslie (1993), the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 reaffirms that the federal
government is responsible for equalizing the ability of provincial governments to provide
comparable levels of public services at comparable levels of taxation.
The intergovernmental arrangements in Germany have many features that characterize
unitary states - a strong central government with an extensive area of influence, uniformity in
legislation on almost all important issues, and a uniform tax system. The Federal Republic of
Germany consists ofthe Federal Government, 16 Lander and a local government sector that is not
very significant in the functioning ofthe federation. The German Constitution places emphasis on
uniformity ofliving conditions for the whole nation rather than on minimum standards.
Another important characteristic ofthe German federalism is the strong co-ordination of
policies among different layers ofgovernment. At the central level, emphasis is laid on legislative
functions, allocation of financial resources and the formulation ofpolicy guidelines. States and
local governments are generally in charge ofimplementation and administering policies. Lower
levels ofgovernment often execute policies on behalfofthe higher levels ofgovernment, where
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financing is sometimes tied to the functions performed, with corresponding grants or cost
restitution. A federal legislation also requires that some functions be financed by the lower tiers
from their own resources without compensation. States bear the responsibilities for
administration including tax administration.
The German financial arrangements are such that the horizontal distribution offunctions is
matched by the prevalence of revenue sharing. All major income taxes and corporate income
taxes and the value-added tax accrue to federal and state governments jointly. Legislation on
taxes is uniform and centralised (Spahn and Fottinger, 1997).
3.2 Assignment of Responsibilities
3.2.1. Expenditure assignment
In Australia, a little above 50% of the total public sector spending is the responsibility of the
Commonwealth government (Craig, 1997). The bulk ofthe remaining expenditure is incurred at
the state level. Social welfare and health spending take the largest share ofthe Commonwealth
spending. Defence is another important component of the Commonwealth budget. The total
share of spending for the Commonwealth has been on the decline relative to GDP over the last
decade as a result oflarge grants that are made to sub-national governments for education, health
services, housing and social security.
State government expenditures are closely aligned with the residual constitutional powers
of this level of government. These are expenditures on education, health services, housing and
community amenities, law, order, public safety, transport and communications, and social
services. Local government functions include the provision oftransport services, recreational and
cultural facilities, housing and community services such as local roads and parks (Craig, 1997).
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The 1988 Constitution ofBrazil assigns relatively few functions exclusively to each level
of government. It reserves to the federal level its traditional functions, notably defence, foreign
affairs, control of the money supply and of the financial system, and the exploitation of certain
monopolies that are currently in the process ofbeing dismantled. A large portion ofthe federal
share ofexpenditure is towards social security and social assistance, general administration, and
interest on the public debt. State spending is concentrated on general administration, education,
social assistance and health. Municipal spending focuses on general administration, housing and
urban services, primary education, health and local public transport.
Table 3.2 EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT
EDUCATION DEFENCE FOREIGN HEALTH MAC.ECON. WELFARE
AFFAIRS MAN.
AUSTRALIA
Responsibility F,S F F F,S F F,S
Provider F,S F F F,S F F,S
CANADA
Responsibility F,S,L F F F,S,L F F,S,L
Provider F,S,L F F F,S,L F F,S,L
GERMANY
Responsibility S F F S F S
Provider S,L F F S,L F S,L
BRAZIL
Responsibility F F F F,S F F,SProvider F,S,L F F F,S,L F
Source: Compiled from Hutter and Shah, 1998
F =Federal S = State L =Local
The Constitution reserves to the state and municipal levels, the provision of police and
other security services as well as a few other services in their respective geographical areas. For
the vast part ofthe public expenditure, the Constitution envisages concurrent responsibilities to be
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further specified by federal law. This law, however, has not yet been proposed. This lack of
clarity in assignment of spending responsibilities has contributed to duplication and waste of
resources in the provision ofgoods and services. For instance, the federal government continues
to be actively involved in the provision ofbasic education, which, in principle, should be carried
out by the local level ofgovernment with financial support from the higher levels ofgovernment.
This is done to ensure minimum standards in service provision nationwide.
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity in spending assignment, in practice, there has been a
clear trend toward a decentralization ofpublic expenditure. This trend has been a response to the
stress on the federal budget. Over the years, there has been a decline in the federal share ofpublic
expenditure, as a result of the unplanned and involuntary decentralization of spending (Ter
Minassian, 1997).
The federal government ofCanada is responsible for services with national scope, such as
defense, international affairs, social services, debt charges, industrial policy and research. The
federal government has over time taken for itself functions that were traditionally provincial
functions, such as the social safety net. The social safety net consists ofpayments made directly
to individuals and payments made from one level of government to another to support social
safety net activities. A large proportion of transfers to individuals include assistance for the
unemployed, family allowances, a universal old age pension, and national health insurance. The
federal government also makes transfers to provinces to fund programs in post-secondary
education, health care and welfare.
The provincial and local governments in Canada have major responsibility for spending on
goods and services that are local in nature, such as public education, health care, and municipal
services. However, the federal government does have concurrent spending powers for provincial
functions which it exercises in the form of transfer paYments (Krelove, Stotsky and Vehorn,
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1997).
The German Constitution assigns defense, foreign affairs, citizenship, immigration and
emigration, international treaties, currency matters, federal transport, and postal and
telecommunication services to the federal government. The states are responsible for remaining
areas such as culture, education, law and order, environmental and health policies as well as
regional economic policy. The Municipalities have a responsibility for communal services, such as
local health facilities, sports and recreation, school building, housing, and road construction.
Owing to the high degree of horizontal integration of functions the division of
responsibilities in the German federation is not reflected in the distribution ofpublic expenditures
across all levels of government. As mentioned earlier, lower levels of governments receive
specific mandates and earmarked resources for the delivery of those responsibilities that are
commissioned by the higher levels of government (Spahn and Fottinger, 1997).
3.2.2. Revenue Assignment
The major sources of revenue of the Australian Commonwealth flows from four major tax
revenues. These are personal income tax, customs and excise duties, company income tax and
sales tax. Almost 90% ofthe Commonwealth revenue comes from taxation, 60% ofwhich is made
up ofcompany and personal income taxes and 23% from taxes on goods and services (sales tax).
The state governments receive about 40% of grants and advances from the Commonwealth
revenue. A further 40% of revenue for the state sector comes from a diversity oftaxes such as
payroll tax, property taxes as well as taxes and fees on motor vehicles, gambling and insurance.
The tax bases are similar in every state, but tax rates and base definitions vary substantially from
one state to another.
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The taxation systems ofthe Commonwealth, state and local governments in Australia are
administered by separate entities. The Australian Taxation Office administers all the major taxes
imposed by the Commonwealth government. The state and local governments maintain smaller
agencies to administer their taxes and fees (Craig, 1997).
The Brazilian federal government is assigned the responsibility for personal income tax,
the corporate income tax, a selective value-added-tax (essentially an excise tax), a tax on rural
property, various types of social security contributions levied on payroll or turnover of
enterprises, taxes on foreign trade and certain taxes on financial operations.
Apart from their share of the federal revenue from personal income tax, selective value-
added-tax, corporate tax and rural property tax, states are assigned a broad based value added tax
(VAT), a tax on motor vehicles and estate and gift taxes. In addition to their 50 percent share of
the federally collected revenue, municipalities are assigned a tax on urban real estate property.
The distribution ofrevenue across levels ofgovernment and by type oftax has undergone
significant changes in recent years, with the share of the federal government (before revenue
sharing) in total tax revenues declining by about 5.5 percentage points betw~en 1988 and 1995 to
around 62 percent. Currently various forms ofsocial security contributions account for about 55
percent ofown revenues ofthe federal government, the ICMS (or VAT) accounts for nearly 93
percent of states' revenues and taxes on services (or 188) provides nearly half of those of
municipalities (Ter Minassian, 1997).
In Canada the major sources of revenue are personal income tax, corporate tax and the
goods and services tax (VAT) which are collected at the federal level. The personal income tax
and the corporate tax are remitted in part to provinces. The provinces collect retail sales tax and
the resource tax, while the local level ofgovernment collects property tax (Craig, 1997).
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TYPE OF TAX AUSTRALIA CANADA GERMANY BRAZIL
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
Base Definition F F F F
Administration F F F F
CORPORATE TAX
Base Definition F F F F
Administration F F F F
CUSTOMS
Base Definition F,S F F F
Administration F,S F F F
MULTI-STAGE SALES TAX (VAT)
Base Definition N/A F,S F F,S,L
Administration N/A F,S F F,S,L
EXCISES ON ALCOHOL &TOBACCO
Base Definition S F F N/A
Administration S F F N/A
BETTING, GAMBLING, LOTTERIES
Base Definition S F,S N/A N/A
Administration S F N/A N/A
MOTOR VEIDCLE FEES
Base Definition L F,S F,S S
Administration L F F S
PROPERTY
Base Definition N/A S,L F,L L
Administration N/A S,L F L
TABLE- 33 REVENUE ASSIGNMENT
SOURCE: Huter and Shah, 1998
F=Federal S=State L=Local
In Germany, the power to legislate specific taxes is totally distinct from the right ofeach
layer of government to appropriate the proceeds from these taxes. Although tax legislation is
fully centralized, all of the important revenue sources are shared in Germany. The wage and
assessed income taxes, corporate tax and VAT, which yield almost three quarters of total tax
revenue or 71 percent oftotal taxes are all jointly appropriated. In addition, local business tax is
shared by all levels of government, and a part of the revenue from the federal mineral oil tax is
granted to the state governments in order to subsidize their regional public transportation.
Tax assignment to specific levels of governments in Germany is determined by the
Constitution. Major revisions of federal financial arrangements can be made only through an
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amendment to the Constitution which requires a two-third majority in both houses ofthe federal
parliament. The significance of taxes directly assigned to each layer of government is small.
The main federal taxes are excises, the most important ofwhich are those on mineral oil, tobacco,
and alcohol. These constitute roughly 17 percent oftotal taxes. The federal government also has
the right to levy a surcharge on income taxes. From its share ofthe VAT, the federal government
has to finance Germany's contribution to the budget ofthe European Union. The main state taxes
are the motor vehicle tax and wealth tax. These account for 5 percent of total taxes.
Municipalities levy local business tax, property taxes as well as communal levies on public utilities,
while local governments collect about 7 percent of all taxes (Spahn and Fottinger, 1997).
3.3 Borrowing
Borrowing in Australia is co-ordinated by the Loan Council, which was given formal status in
legislation passed by the Commonwealth and the states from 1927 to 1929. It was finally
sanctioned by the Constitution after a referendum of 1928. The Council comprises one
representative ofthe Commonwealth; the Prime Minister or a nominee and one representative of
each state and the State Premier or a nominee.
Since the 1992/93 financial year, the Loan Council has introduced transparent
macroeconomic controls over the operation of the public sector. The requirement is that each
state and the Commonwealth present to the Loan Council its net financing requirements for the
coming financial year. These proposals are considered by the Loan Council taking into account
the fiscal position and reasonable infrastructure needs of each jurisdiction as well as the
macroeconomic implications of the Loan Council allocations (Craig, 1997).
Since the 1960s, state borrowing in Brazil has primarily been used to finance public
infrastructure. The loans are mainly financed by federal institutions that channel to state utilities
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and other enterprises funds collected through a variety offorced savings schemes. In the 1970s,
the federal and state governments resorted to external borrowing as a result of the dwindling of
resources from the state owned institutions. A number of states, however, defaulted on the
internal and external debt as a result ofthe economic recession. This led to the interventionby the
federal government. As a result, some ofthe state's debt were rescheduled and taken over by the
federal Treasury. The seriousness ofthe state debt led to a tightening ofthe controls on new state
borrowing. Central bank regulations now prohibit a state from borrowing from its own banks.
,This prohibition does not, however, extend to borrowing from other state banks (Ter Minassian,
1997).
The Canadian federal government can borrow funds for current and capital purposes with
no formal constitutional restrictions. Provincial governments can also borrow funds for current
and capital purposes with no formal constitutional or federal government restrictions. Also,
provincial governments are not required to balance their current budgets annually, as is typical in
other federations. Both federal and provincial governments are, however, subjected to some
market discipline through private ratings done by international investment firms.
The federal government has several sources of borrowing, such as the bond markets,
marketable bonds, treasury bills and other debt liabilities. Provincial governments have two major
sources of borrowing, namely the bond market and the Canada Pension Plan. The Canada
Pension Plan uses its surplus above the current needs to purchase preferentially rated securities
from the provinces (Kre1ove, Stotsky and Vehorn, 1997).
In Germany direct government borrowing from the central bank is prohibited, as is
privileged access of public authorities to financing institutions. The Constitution restricts
borrowing to the amount of projected outlays for investment purposes in the budget. Similar
provisions apply to state budgets in accordance with state constitutions or legislation. Local
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government borrowing is tied to their cash flow and is subject to state control (Spahn and
Fottinger, 1997).
3.4 Macroeconomic Management
Whilst it is the primary responsibility ofthe Commonwealth level ofgovernment in Australia to do
macroeconomic management, it is recognized that successful stabilization policy requires
intergovernmental co-operation. Fiscal policy is influenced by the changes in the
Commonwealth's own revenue and spending levels, the size of grants paid to sub-national
governments, and changes in the access of sub-national governments to borrowing. However,
state and local governments still maintain some degree of independence in budgetary decisions
flowing from their own substantial sources ofrevenue. Correct predictions ofthe likely response
ofthe sub-national governments to both economic development and the Commonwealth's own
policies is important in assessing overall impact ofpublic sector activity.
The stabilization efforts of the Commonwealth government since 1993 were less
successful when compared with the fiscal position ofthe sub-national governments that were all
running surpluses in 1996. The sub-national governments achieved these through deliberate
reductions in spending, resulting from the significant reductions in numbers ofpublic employees.
The same period saw sub-national governments raising more revenue from taxes by tapping into
new bases and raising taxes on existing tax bases (Craig, 1997).
Macroeconomic management in Brazil is vested in the federal level of government.
Macroeconomic management in Brazil has experienced a profound change as a result of the
changes in mechanisms for intergovernmental relations. Three interrelated problems have
emerged concerning the conduct offiscal policy: (1) the federal government has lost considerable
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control over some fiscal policy instruments; (2) the effectiveness ofthe instruments under federal
jurisdictions can be potentially undermined by fiscal behavior at lower levels ofgovernment; and
(3) the federal government has come under a fiscal squeeze because decentralization of tax
authority and transfer of revenues have not been accompanied in practice by a transfer of
expenditure responsibilities (Ter Minassian, 1997).
As in other industrial nations, the federal budget has been used as a tool of
macroeconomic management in the period following WorId War IT in Canada. In recent decades,
the rapid rise in government spending that is not matched by a similar increase in revenue has led
to large structural deficits and a high debt burden. Also provincial governments are allowed to
run their own budget deficits. This has created a heavier consolidated public debt burden and has
also complicated the task of fiscal stabilization for the federal government. This is because, in
principle, provinces can conduct their own fiscal management, in line with their own objectives,
which may be incompatible with those ofthe federal government (Kre1ove, Stotsky and Vehom,
1997).
3.5 Performance of Fiscal Decentralization
In Australia, the federal government is constitutionally required to follow regionally differentiated
policies. Although finances are relatively centralized, with a large vertical imbalance favoring the
central government, the need to take account ofthe reactions of state and local governments to
Commonwealth policies adds to the difficulty of implementing stabilization policy. While the
Commonwealth has the financial power to exert considerable influence on the behavior of sub-
national governments, (see Table 3.4) recent efforts have been directed to achieving better
cooperation and coordination ofpolicy through effort to involve sub-national governments in the
attainment ofimportant national goals. Further, the powers and composition ofthe Loan Council
in Australia assist in the improvement ofcooperation within this two-tiered centralized federation.
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The cooperation in the Australian federation is also strengthened by the existence of the
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) which is one of the distinguishing features of the
federation. The CGC operates under terms of reference set by the Commonwealth after
consultation with states and territories.
The CGC's investigations aim to determine relative needs according to the principle 'that
each State should be given the capacity to provide the same standard ofstate-type service as the
other states, if it makes the same effort to raise revenues from its own sources and conducts its
affairs with the same operational level of efficiency' (Kre1ove, Stotsky and Vehom, 1997).
As shown in Table 3.4, Canada has a two-tiered, highly decentralized system where
spending and revenue-raising responsibilities are appropriately matched. The coordinate-authority
model ofthe Canadian federation has a strong constitutional basis, a fairly strong state influence
on federal policy makers. An important characteristic ofthe federation is that it has proven to be
flexible and has allowed for the continued evolution of the system to accommodate new
innovations and changes.
The Canadian system is also highly decentralized with respect to federal-provincial
relations and is strongly redistributive. Intergovernmental grants are effectively used to equalize
the ability to pay for public services and to correct spillovers. Fiscal equalization is a federal
program of annual, unconditional payments to provinces which have a substandard capacity to
derive revenues from taxation and therefore a substandard capacity to finance public services for
their citizens.
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f let dtis al t
Source: Shah 1997
Table 3.4 A Companson 0 se e e, c sys ems
Tax Tax overlapping Tax Sharing
Separation
Australia Canada Germany Brazil
tate influence on federal policy makers Fairly Strong Strong Strong Strong
tate government constitutional status Strong Fairly strong Strong Strong
in law; very
strong in fact
LCtual state control of local government Strong Strong Strong Weak
~ge of local government responsibilities Limited Fairly Limited Extensive
extensive
,ocal government influence on state Weak Fairly strong Weak Strong
,olicymakers
-ocal government'influence on state policy' " Weak Fairly strong Weak' Strong
-ocal government influence on federal policy Weak Weak Weak Strong
['he character offiscal federalism. Two-tiered; Two-tiered Two-tiered; Three-tiered;
Centralised Decentralise Integrated Decentralised
~ederal-state intergovernmental transfers Important, Important; Unimportant; Important
Emphasis on Emphasis on emphasis on
conditional Unconditional tax sharing
grants grants
~ed~a1Iinterstateequalisation perf01mance Verr strong; Strong; Strong; Weak






State tax performance Fairly Weak Strong Fairly strong Strong
Local Government fiscal independence Fairly Strong Fairly Strong Weak Weak
Equalisation formula Federal-state Federal-state Explicit and Implicit and
explicit and fiscal complex piecemeal
complex equalisation
State-local revenues more or less match No Yes Yes Yes
responsibilities
The Canadian Parliament and the Government are committed to the principle of making
equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide
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reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
According to (Kerlove, Stotsky and Vehorn, 1997), the Canadian "fiscal equalization program"
has endured and is often referred to as the "glue that holds the federation together".
The similarities of the Canadian and the Australian systems lie in the quest to match
spending with the revenues generated in a particular jurisdiction. In the case of Canada, the
responsibility for equalization is with the Government and Parliament whilst the CGC in Australia
is entrusted with this function.
It can be concluded from the review above that fiscal federalism has proved to be effective
in Canada and Australia. These systems present a good model for developing nations.
Whilst the emphasis is placed on the coordination of activities of distinct levels of
government in Australia and Canada, the German system emphasizes, to a high degree, regional
availability ofpublic infrastructure and government services. Financing public services is mainly
based on shared taxes and equalization arrangements stressing the uniformity ofliving conditions
in the whole nation and on horizontal cooperation among layers ofgovernment (Table 3.4).
The German system ofintergovernmental fiscal relations, however, has a number offlaws,
such as the mismatch between revenue-raising and expenditure that reduce its efficiency and
impinge on interregional equity. These flaws result from the strict interpretation ofthe uniformity
ofliving conditions mandated by the Constitution. In spite ofthis negative element, the German
fiscal federal relations have created a high degree ofhomogeneity regarding regional availability of
public infrastructure and government services. According to Spahn and Fottinger (1997), this is
the basis on which the German economy thrives. Financing public services is mainly based on
shared taxes ~nd equalization arrangements, stressing the uniformity of living conditions in the
whole nation and on horizontal cooperation among layers ofgovernment. This has, however, not
prevented regional authorities from exerting influential roles within the realm of their own
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jurisdiction and at the level of the federation.
Unlike the German system, the Brazilian intergovernmental fiscal relations allow states
and to a lesser extent the municipalities, substantial own revenue-raising powers (see Table 3.4).
This should foster fiscal responsibility and political accountability for their budgetary policies.
The current system oftax assignment is incompatible with the received wisdom in the literature as
well as the prevailing international practice in this area. For instance, the co-existance ofabroad-
based state VAT with a more narrowly based multi-rate federal VAT is awkward and has given
rise to distortions in the tax burden across sectors and localities.
The Constitution ofBrazil also envisages concurrent responsibilities to be further specified
by federal legislation, which at present has not been proposed. The lack of clarity in the
assignment of spending responsibilities also contributes to duplication and waste ofresources in
the provision of goods and services. The effect of this is that the system of revenue sharing is
based on rigid coefficients, for both vertical and horizontal distribution, which are not based on
transparent criteria linked to t~ capacities, tax efforts and expenditure needs.
3.6 Factors Influencing Decentralization
3.6.1 Diversity.
A federal system should provide scope for variety and differences in fiscal arrangements pertaining
to different states and localities. Communities may differ in their preferences for public services
and should therefore not be forced into a uniform pattern (Brown and Jackson, 1990). In order to
provide for a diverse community, more decentralization is necessary. Otherwise, certain
merchanisms must be in place to ensure that diverse needs are provided for in the case ofa public
product that is produced and delivered from a central level.
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The Australian, Canadian and Brazilian systems tend to comply with the requirement that
recognizes differing localities and differences in preferences of communities for public services.
However, the extent to which these countries comply differs. Of the four foreign countries
reviewed Brazil seems to go the farthest in terms of fiscal decentralization followed by Canada
and then Australia. However, this is in a sharp contrast to the German federation, which places
emphasis on uniform living conditions for its citizens.
3.6.2 Equivalence.
A good system of decentralization would appropriately match the service with the level that
ensures optimum benefit to the users of that service. This brings about value for money and
proper accountability. In the four countries reviewed, there is compliance with this principle,
particularly on those public services that benefit the whole country and are efficiently provided at
federal level. This includes for example defense, foreign affairs and macroeconomic management.
There is, however, a wide range of differences among countries at state and local government
level depending on the level.of decentralization of a country.
3.6.3 Locational neutrality.
Decentralization is affected in this instance where a region has an ability to raise certain taxes
which are similar to those raised at the national level, but the same does not apply to other
regions. Should the more affluent regions be allowed to raise the said tax, they will be able to
provide additional services therefore distorting the need to provide services equitably. Brazil is
the only country amongst the four countries reviewed that does not comply with this principle. In
Brazil, there is a coexistence ofVAT at both state and federal government levels which has given
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rise to distortions in the tax burden across sectors. Furthermore, the federal legislation required
by the Brazilian Constitution to define spending assignments have not been proposed, this has led
to duplication and waste of resources.
3.6·.4 Centralized stabilization.
The use offiscal instruments for purposes ofmacropolity (stabilization, growth) has to be at the
national level. Local governments do not have the policy instruments to make stabilization policy
on their own (Brown and Jackson, 1990).
Federal or central governments have a fundamental role in ensuring that minimum or
uniform services are rendered to all citizens of a country. In a decentralized system, federal
governments are best placed to utilise instruments available to them to provide for stabilization
from a central level.
All the countries reviewed have complied with this principle and the issue of fiscal
stabilization and economic growth has been approached in a similar way.
3.6.5 Correction for spill-overs
Benefit spill-overs between jurisdictions lead to inefficient expenditure decisions. This calls for
correction by higher level government (Brown and Jackson, 1990).
In a decentralized system people have a choice in terms ofwhere they reside sometime in
pursuit ofjob opportunities or relative peace. The mobility of people and resources cannot be
restricted at all times. This tends to lead to expenditure pressures on states or jurisdictions that
people locate to, leading to the need for equalization grants.
In Brazil federal or interstate equalization is weak which is explained by the lack of
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emphasis on intergovernmental transfers of any kind. Also once the expenditure assignment is
purely defined, the Brazilian system will also show the need to tackle intergovernmental revenue-
expenditure disparities. In Australia, interstate equalization is very strong and revenue-
expenditure disparities have been substantially reduced. Canada and Germany are also strong on
the interstate equalization.
3.6.6 Minimum provision of essential public services.
The national governments should assure their citizens that, no matter in which state or local area
they reside, they will be provided with a minimum level ofcertain essential public services such as
safety, health, welfare and education (Brown and Jackson, 1990).
In Germany, the emphasis is on uniform living conditions for every citizen which goes
beyond the question ofminimum norms and standards in the service provision. As shown in Table
3.2, Canada, Brazil and Australia also have, as a constitutional prescript, the provision of
minimum standard in the provision of public services. It is also important that there are
similarities in the provision of defense, education and welfare in all the countries reviewed.
3.6.7 Equalization of fiscal position.
While redistribution is primarily an inter-individual matter, the existence of sharp regional
differences in the balance between fiscal capacity and need among local governments cannot be
disregarded entirely. Some degree offiscal equalization among local governments is called for so
that minimum service levels can be secured with more or less comparable tax efforts (Brown and
Jackson, 1990).
As a result of very strong federal and interstate equalization performance in Australia,
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Canada and Germany, the revenue and expenditure disparities in these countries have been
reduced substantially (Table 3.4). Canada has a strong tax collection in the states, while Germany
is fairly strong and Australia fairly weak, which accounts for the strong Australian equalization
programme.
These principles are very difficult to adhere to. Some ofthem conflict, and they might
have economic costs associated with them. It is concluded that these factors are satisfied in the
four countries reviewed. The Australian system with its supporting structures such as the CGC
and the Loan Council seem to be leading the pack in the system offiscal federalism. Australia is
closely followed by the Canadian system which is in turn followed by the German system.
3.7 Summary
1. Although structured differently the countries reviewed tend to assign functions in a
manner that is consistent with the public finance theory that functions that are distributive
in nature and those that are meant to ensure the country's stability should be reserved
exclusively as federal or national government competence.
2. Whereas the Australian, Canadian and Brazilian's tax decentralization show a number of
significant taxes that are devolved to the lower levels ofgovernment, the German model
represents a strong concentration the center. The discrepancy is compensated for by the
use of equalization grants in the German model.
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Chapter 4
Fiscal Federalism in South Africa
4.1 The Structure of Government
The South African Constitution, Act No. 108 of 1996, establishes national, provincial and local
government as autonomous spheres that are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. As can
be seen in Table 4.1, there are nine provinces in South Africa and about 500 municipalities. There
is a move to restructure the municipal level ofgovernment with a view to reducing their numbers
and establishing mega cities for better control and coordination. The Constitution also identifies
functional areas of concurrent and exclusive competence. In order to give effect to the
requirements ofthe Constitution, budgetary procedures and other institutional arrangements have
been put in place. The budget making process is the responsibility of all the three spheres of
Government (DoF, 1998).
Provision is also made in the Constitution for the intervention ofthe national government
through legislation with regard to matters falling within a functional area of another sphere of
government. A number ofActs, such as the Financial Management Act of1999 have been passed
in this regard. These measures may only be necessary to maintain national security, economic
unity and essential national norms and standards. Provision is also made to establish minimum
standards required for the rendering of services, prevent a province to take action that may be
prejudicial to the interests of another province or to the country as a whole. To this extent, the
national government is mandated by the Constitution to perform fiscal stabilization and co-
ordination functions for the country as a whole, (Government of South Africa, 1996).
In order to coordinate the activities of government with regard to the concurrent
functions, there is a National Council of Provinces, that is the upper house of the national
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assembly, that looks after the interests of provinces when legislation that will affect the
functioning of provinces is discussed.
The Constitution provides for the establishment of the FFC. The FFC has been in
existence since 1994. Unlike the Commonwealth Grants Commission in Australia, the South
African FFC is not independent as envisaged in the Constitution. The FFC is an advisory body,
appointed by the President of the country and accountable to Parliament. The FFC makes
recommendations on financial and fiscal matters of the national and sub-national governments.
There is also no clear mechanism ofgiving this advice to the law making bodies. The role ofthe
FFC is therefore minimal in terms ofits influence on the system ofintergovernmental relations in
the country. Nevertheless, the FFC has contributed significantly to the development of the
intergovernmental system. The FFC's recommendations for the division ofresources between the
three spheres of government (revenue sharing) form the basis of the current system of revenue
allocation. Most recently the FFC has made recommendations regarding the establishment ofthe
local government equitable share.
Table 4.1 shows that decision making in the South African federation is relatively
centralized, with a large vertical imbalance favouring the central government. As a consequence
of this strength, the national government is in a position to influence the policies of the sub-
national governments. A number of institutions such as the Budget Council and the Budget
Forum have been created through legislation in order to support the intergovernmental
cooperation in South Africa. The Budget Council consists ofProvincial Ministers ofFinance and
the national minister, whilst the Budget Forum is an extension ofthe Budget Council by including
the representatives of local government.
As in the case ofthe Loans Council in Australia, there is a Loans Coordinating Committee
which is chaired by the Minister ofFinance and has a membership of the provincial ministers of
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Finance. This committee has not really done any significant work and its performance cannot be
evaluated.
Co-operative governance between the spheres ofgovernment has also been given effect
through the enactment ofvarious pieces oflegislation required by Chapter 13 and other sections
of the Constitution. Chapter 13 of the Constitution provides for General Financial Matters and
also defines the framework for the establishment ofcontrol institutions, powers and functions on
financial matters. The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) Act gives purpose to the
requirements relating to the FFC under Section 220 ofthe Constitution. The Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations Act establishes a formal process for dealing with intergovernmental budgetary
issues. The Act is designed to facilitate and regulate a process ofconsultation to achieve a budget
making process that is fair. The Act gives effect to Section 214 ofthe Constitution by setting out
the process to arrive at the equitable share ofrevenue raised nationally for the national, provincial
and local spheres ofgovernment. This includes the equitable division of the provincial share of
that revenue among provinces.
4.2 Assignment of Responsibilities
4.2.1 Expenditure Assignment
In South Africa, national government policies influence provincial and local government spending
indirectly through co-operative agreements and legislation setting norms and standards. A large
portion ofthe national government expenditure is allocated to the functions that are determined by
the Constitution to be under the exclusive powers ofthe national government. These exclusive
powers include the administration ofjustice, national security (which is vested in a single defence
force), a single police service and intelligence services, tertiary education, national and
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international airports, lotteries and sports pools, national parks and marine resources, and national
public enterprises (Government of South Africa, 1996).
As can be seen in table 4.2 expenditure on the exclusive functions mentioned above
totalled R72.30 billion in 1995/96. This expenditure increased to R83.70 billion in 1996/97during
which time some elements ofthe revenue sharing mechanism were introduced. Expenditure on the
national exclusive functions, further increased by 6% in 1997/98 to R88.70 billion and by 2.8% in
1998/99 to R91.20 billion. The expenditure is projected to increase by 4.8% in 1999/2000 to
R98.10 billion. (DoF Budget Review, 1998). As a share of the total consolidated general
government expenditure, exclusive functions accounted for 46% in the 1995/96, increased to
47.20% in 1996/97 and 46.90% in 1997/98. In 1998/9944.70% ofthe total consolidated general
government expenditure was spent on exclusive functions. This expenditure is expected to
increase to 45.27 in 1999/2000 and drop back to 44.8% in 2000/2001.
alST bI 4 1 So h Afr' Ina e . ut lca: tere:overnment system
Indicator Characteristics
1 Structure of Government National Government, 9 Provinces and about 500 local authorities
n Expenditure Assignment Education Defence Foreign Health Mac.Econ. Welfare
Affairs Man
Responsibility
N;> N N N,P,L N N;>,L
Provider
N;> N N N,P,L N N;>,L
ill Revenue Assignment Personal Corporate Customs VAT Excise Betting & Motor Prope
Income Tax Tax Gambling vehicle rty
Base Definition N N N N N N,P P L
Administration N N N N N N,P P L
Source. Compiled from Shah 1997
N= National P= Provincial L= Local
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~able 4.2 Consolidated national and provincial expenditure: Functional & Assignment Breakdown
l billions
95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/2000 2000101
~xclusive National Functions
)efence 11.6 11.8 10.7 11.0 11.6 12.3
ustice 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.0
)olice 9.3 11.4 13.1 14.1 15.1 16.0
)risons 2.7 3.1 3.9 5.4 5.8 6.4
~ater scheme, related services 1.4 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.3
;'uel and Energy 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
vfining 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
v1anufacturing 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6
~egional development 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
)ther 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.6 3.2 3.8
Jeneral admin, other 10.8 13.5 13.2 9 10.7 11.7
nterest 29.5 34.6 38.6 43.0 45.3 48.1
~UB-TOTAL 72.30 83.70 88.70 91.20 98.10 105.3
46% 47.20% 46.90% 44.70% 45.27% 44.80%
Concurrent Functions
Education 34.6 39.2 40.3 46.8 49.2 52.2
Health 16.1 18.5 20.2 25.1 26.4 28.1
Social Security & Welfare 15.2 16.4 18.4 19.8 20.7 22.2
Housing 3.0 1.6 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.3
Other 5.1 5.7 5.5 6.5 6.5 7.5
Transport, Communication 7.3 7.7 7.3 6.5 7.0 7.7
Agriculture, fores1Iy, fishing 3.5 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.9
SUB-TOTAL 84.80 93.50 100.40 112.90 118.60 129.70
54% 52.80% 53.10% 55.30% 54.73% 55.20%
TOTAL 157.1 177.20 189.10 204.10 216.70 235.00
Source: Department of Finance Budget Review 1998
Some 80% of provincial government expenditure is distributed between health, education and
welfare. These expenditures are concurrent in terms of the constitutional prescriptions, but
constitute a significant amount of work in provincial governments (Table 4.1). In 1995/96,
expenditure on education for instance increased by 11.73%, in 1996/97 by 13.3%, in 1997/98 by
2.8% and by 16.1% in 1998/99 financial year. Thereafter projected growth in spending on
education is around 5% per annum. Expenditure on health has also seen an increasing trend.
Spending on health increased by 14.9% in 1996/97 and had a lesser increase in 1997/98 financial
year to a significant increase of 24.3% in 1998/99. For 1999/2000, growth of around 5% is
, estimated. As a share of the consolidated government expenditure, spending on concurrent
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functions accounted for54% in 1995/96, 52.8% in 1996/97, rising to 53.1% in 1997/98, and
55.3% in 1998/99. It is projected that the share of spending on concurrent functions will
represent 55.2% ofthe total consolidated government expenditure in 2000/2001.
Since the 1995/96 financial year, the concurrent functions have received an increasing
share ofthe total consolidated government expenditure. Most ofthese are functions that underpin
the reconstruction and development programme.
Provincial exclusive functions include provincial roads and traffic, provincial planning,
provincial sport, recreation and amenities, cultural matters and liquor licenses. In relation to the
total consolidated general government expenditure, expenditure on provincial exclusive functions
is insignificant. Municipal expenditure is in respect offunctions such as beaches and amusement
facilities, municipal roads, municipal parks and recreation, traffic and parking, local amenities and
general municipal services such as water provisioning and energy (Government ofSouth Africa,
1996).
4.2.2 Revenue Assignment
The South African Constitution provides that each sphere of government is entitled to an
equitable share ofrevenue raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform the
functions allocated to it. The equitable division of revenue takes into account the functions
assigned to each sphere under the Constitution and the capacity of each government to pay for
these functions through own receipts and revenues. These functions have been outlined in the
previous section (Government of South Africa, 1996; and DoF, 1998).
The equitable share is an unconditional allocation to the national government, provinces
and local governments. Provincial and local governments are fully responsible for these funds and
are directly accountable for the expenditures out of them. In addition to their equitable share,
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provinces and local governments may receive other allocations from the national share as
conditional grants to finance specific expenditures that may be determined by national
government, as directed by national norms or co-operative agreements (DoF, 1998).
Under the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act of1997, the budget process begins with
the FFC making recommendations on the division of revenue 10 months before the start of the
financial year. The Minister of Finance is then required to consult with provinces, local
government and the FFC concerning the proposals of the FFC. The Act establishes a Budget
Council and Budget Fomm to facilitate consultation with provinces and local government. The
Minister ofFinance is also required to table a Division ofRevenue Bill at the time ofthe Budget,
specifying the allocations to each sphere ofgovernment and the conditions that may apply to any
ofthe allocations. The 1998/99 budget was the first to be guided fully by the requirements ofthe
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act.
The taxation system in South Africa is managed by a single national entity known as the South
African Revenue Services (SARS). SARS collects and administers all taxes on behalf of the
national government, which are then shared by all spheres of government as prescribed by the
Constitution.
The formula for the division of revenue between the national and provincial spheres of




P = the total provincial allocation~
S = minimum national standards grant to enable provinces specifically to provide primary and
secondary education and primary and district health care to their residents~
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ID = spi1lover grant to provide for the financing of those services which have interprovincial
spillover effect;
T = fiscal capacity equalisation grant to ensure that provincial functions are financed from an
equitable provincial taxing capacity and to encourage accountability and democratic
institutions associated with the establishment ofprovincial legislatures;
I = institutional grant to provide funds for each province to finance the core ofits legislature
as required by the Constitution; and
B = basic grant to enable provinces to establish and maintain institutions necessary for the
fulfilment of their constitutional obligations according to their constitutional obligations
according to their own priorities (FFC, 1996).
Over and above the elements contained in the formula, the FFC proposes that ad hoc
allocations (ADHp) can be made as conditional grants to provinces to cover contingencies. The
FFC further recommended that provincial borrowings (Borp) and Provincial Own Source
Revenue (0) be included in the formula for the calculation ofthe Provincial total revenue. The
FFC also proposes the granting of a tax room in personal income tax system for provinces to
'piggy-back' on. The tax room is described as the reduction by the national government ofits tax
rate in order for provinces to levy a surcharge on the tax up to the maximum left by the national
government. For the tax room to be implemented, it is required that a national law be enacted. In
the interim, the FFC proposes that a transitionally assigned surcharge (TAS) be introduced to
start the process ofencouraging the collection ofrevenue through taxation by provinces. Taking
all these elements into consideration, the complete formula is therefore as follows:
p = S + ID + T+ 1+ B + AdHp +Borp + TAS + 0
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(4.2)
Where the national share will be determined as:
G' = ocR + BorG - AdHp (4.3)
In equation 4.3, G represents the total national revenue after all adjustments have been
made, and BorG the total borrowing by the national government, and ocR represent the change in
the nationally collected revenue (FFC, 1996).
The Constitution places limitations on the power ofprovincial and local governments to
raise revenue. In terms ofthe Constitutio~provinces' power to impose taxes, levies, duties and
surcharges may not be exercised in a way that materially and unreasonably prejudices national
economic policies, economic activities across provincial boundaries, or the national mobility of
goods, services, capital and labour. Also, this power must be regulated by an Act of (national)
parliament after consideration by and recommendation ofthe FFC (Constitution ofthe RSA, Act
108 of 1996). Provincial and local governments collect own source revenues that are not included
in the revenue sharing and cannot be deducted from the equitable share.
4.3 Borrowing
The Constitution of South Africa provides that a province or a municipality may raise loans for
capital and current expenditure in accordance with reasonable conditions determined by national
legislation, but loans for current expenditure may be raised only when necessary for bridging
purposes during a fiscal year. The said legislation may be enacted only after recommendations
from the FFC have been considered. The Borrowing Powers ofProvincial Governments Act was
passed in 1996. Presently, the national government borrows through the issue of financial
instruments that are sold both domestically and internationally. Provinces are not allowed to
borrow except for the running of overdrafts on their current accounts that are held at various
commercial banks. There is also an agreement that provinces will not exercise their power to
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borrow until after the 1999/2000 financial year. The agreement for Provinces not to borrow in
order to increase their capacity to deliver infrastructure will be reviewed on a year to year basis.
Municipalities, however, are allowed to borrow for current expenditure as well as for
infrastructure development. A number of municipalities are rated by outside agencies and that
gives them a better standing to borrow within the country (Government of South Africa, 1996).
4.4 Macroeconomic Management
It is the primary function ofthe national government to perform the functions ofmacroeconomic
management functions in South Africa. It is recognized that successful stabilization policy requires
intergovernmental co-operation since fiscal policy is influenced by changes in the national revenue
and spending levels, level ofgrants paid to sub-national governments, and access ofsub-national
governments to borrowing. Provinces, however, have not exercised the right to borrow as
contained in the Borrowing Powers ofProvincial Governments Act of 1997.
Whereas legislation allows provinces to borrow for bridging finance and for the financing
offixed assets, there is an agreement to the effect that no province be allowed to borrow up to the
1999/2000 financial year for a number of reasons. First, the macroeconomic framework of the
country prescribes the maximum level of debt to GDP over the medium term. Given that
subnational governments cannot borrow, the national government is using its borrowing powers
as a stabilization tool and there is no intention to allow provinces room to borrow. Second, most
provinces are not financially sound to satisfY lenders that they can meet their debt obligations.
The capacity and experience of some provinces to manage debt is also in doubt given their bad
record in the management of expenditure. Third, provincial borrowing may, in some
circumstances, crowd out private sector borrowing which may be more economically beneficial to
the country. Also, the magnitude ofthe debt offormer homelands and self-governing territories
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which was taken over by the national government after the integration undermines the provinces'
case to borrow (DoF, 1998).
The constitution provides for minimum standards that should be financed through an
equitable share ofrevenue raised nationally. Yet, the national government departments have not
do~e anything to provide legislation prescribing minimum standards. This gap created by the lack
of legislation has been filled by the existence of other cooperative arrangements that attempt to
bring about some equity in the delivery ofpublic services such as education, health and welfare.
4.5 Factors Influencing Decentralization
4.5.1 Diversity.
South African communities are very diverse, with at least eleven official languages and a variety of
cultures and ethnic groups. As a historical fact, the majority ofpeople within these communities
tend to be located in the different provinces on the basis oftheir cultural and ethnic origins. For
this reason the demands on the fiscus by these communities will always differ from province to
province. The Eastern Cape Province, KwaZulu-Natal Province, the Northern Province and
Mpumalanga for instance, are provinces that have a strong presence of indigenous African
groupings such as Xhosas, the Zulus and the Tsongas respectively. These ethnic groups have a
strong belief in their customs and traditions. For this reason these provinces have demands for
services such as the House ofTraditional Leaders, which is basically to ensure that the effects of
democratic change in the country, does not undermine the fundamental beliefs of these ethnic
groups as a people. It is the reasons of culture and habits that prompted the debate of a




Taxes in South Africa are structured in a manner that does not encourage regional distortions. As
a result the aflluent provinces are theoretically not able to deliver services better than others. In
practice, however, there are qualitative variances in the delivery of social services. For example,
the per capita expenditure on social services such as education and health vary from province to
province, with the aflluent provinces able to maintain higher per capita expenditures.
The national government took a deliberate decision to reverse the inequities ofthe past and allow
for access to services to people that were underserved. This decision has contributed to the
failure to decentralize revenue and expenditure.
4.5.3 Centralized stabilization.
The use of fiscal instruments for purposes of stabilization and growth is a national government
monopoly. Subnational governments do not have the policy instruments to make stabilization
policy on their own. Provinces have to conduct their business in a manner that does not undermine
the attempts and policies ofthe national government in promoting economic growth and ensuring
stability. Subnational governments do not have the ability to undermine the national government
policy priorities because the expenditure and debt targets are set in the macroeconomic
framework by the national Minister ofFinance. These targets in turn determine some 95% ofthe
allocation to subnational governments. Further, subnational governments are not allowed to
borrow nor to budget for a deficit, and should they overrun their budgets, the national
government can intervene by imposing restrictions that are backed by constitutional priorities.
4.5.4 Correction for spill-overs
The mobility ofpeople is on the increase in South Africa. The 1996 census has proved that the
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Gauteng Province has had significant shift in population since the earlier census. This reflects the
attraction ofmiddle income earners to the Province in pursuit ofbetter job opportunities, which
has put some pressure on the Gauteng government's social spending, in particular on health
spending. A similar trend is found in KwaZulu-Natal which shares borders with the Eastern Cape
Province. The general perception in the Eastern Cape is that the quality ofpublic goods is low.
This has led to the situation where people walk across to the KwaZulu-Natal Province to enjoy
services, such as primary health care and primary education which are perceived to be good
quality and cheap. In some ofthe schools and clinics, 100% ofthe beneficiaries come from the
Eastern Cape Province.
4.6 Summary
The major observations that came out of the discussions in this chapter include:
The Government of South Africa is structured as a multi-tier government with a strong
central government that performs the functions of macroeconomic management and
produces national products that would not be produced by other sub-national
governments without perpetuating fiscal distortions.
Unlike other developed fiscally decentralized systems, South Africa has not meaningfully
devolved both expenditure and revenue to sub-national governments. Inorder to promote
good and effective governance it may be useful for South Africa to speed up the
devolution oftaxes to sub-national governments.
The borrowing regime of provincial governments has been suppressed by the national




Fiscal Decentralization Hypothesis: Empirical Tests
5.1 The Fiscal Decentralization (Leviathan) Hypothesis
Following the argument that private monopoly in production leads to relatively high prices and
profits, the public choice literature suggests that similar analysis ofgovernment structure may be
useful in the modeling of public production. Drawing on this analogy, Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) model government as ('Leviathan", i.e., a public entity which systematically seeks to exploit
its citizenry through the maximization of tax revenue it extracts from the economy. From this
perspective, they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain ('Leviathan"
by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments (Oates, 1985).
Brennan and Buchanan's model is an extreme version of the IIpublic choice model" of
government, in which they consider a worst-case scenario ofgovernment unconstrained by the
electoral process. They argue that the electoral process may not effectively constrain the actions
of self-interested, utility-maximizing government agents to those actions that advance public
goods. Rather, majority voting may be subject to exploitation by government agents. Through
strategic determination of policy platforms or collusive behavior with competing government
agents, government may be able to minimize the constraining influence ofthe electoral process.
Furthermore, the actions of some government agents such as tenured bureaucrats may not be
subject to the discipline of the political market place (Grossman, 1992).
According to Brennan and Buchanan, government's ability to maximize revenue is limited
only by the constitutional constraints placed upon its actions. They stress that fiscal
decentralization is one such powerful constraint on Leviathan: competition among governments in
the context ofthe inter-jurisdictional mobility ofpersons in pursuit offiscal gains can offer partial
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or possible complete substitutes for explicitly fiscal constraints on the taxing power. Such
competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal
decisions will greatly limit the capacity ofLeviathan to channel resources into the public sector
(Oates, 1985). Thus the effectiveness ofthe decentralization constraint is greater the more mobile
are voters and the greater the extent to which public goods are local in nature.
As a caveat to their hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan argued that lower-level
governments would try to circumvent the discipline offiscal decentralization by colluding among
themselves or with the central government. They noted that within a constitutionally designed
federal structure, one would predict that there would be constant pressure by competitive lower-
level governments to secure institutional re-arrangements that would moderate competitive
pressures. Such institutional re-arrangements would probably be collusive agreements between the
central and lower-level governments. Lower-level governments would cede to the central
government taxing powers which the central government could then levy across all governments
at a uniform, revenue-maximizing rate. The revenues would then be shared among governments,
with the lower-level governments' share provided in the form of intergovernmental grants
(Grossman, 1992).
Collusion concentrates the powers of taxation in the hands of the central government,
expanding the range over which the central government can apply its monopoly power. The
greater the range ofeconomic activity taxed by the central government, the more potent its taxing
powers are likely to be and the greater will be total public sector size. The potency ofthe central
government's revenue-maximizing pow~rs is likely to increase disproportionately with increases in
the tax bases available to it.
The Leviathan hypothesis is thus motivated by the desire to successfully understand
government behavior as well as to recommend effective means ofcontrolling its behavior. Among
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other suggestions, Brennan and Buchanan offer the private monopoly corollary that competition
among different fiscal units is an effective means ofcontrolling the aggregate size ofLeviathan.
Hence, the resulting decentralization hypothesis that total government intrusion into the economy
should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are
decentralized.
5.2 Empirical Tests of the Decentralization (Leviathan) Hypothesis
While the Leviathan hypothesis has been the source oflively debate and a wide range ofpolicy
proposals, it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing. Recent
empirical studies on this issue have examined the effects of intergovernmental competition on
aggregate government size. In what follows, we review three ofsuch studies, i.e., Oates (1985),
Grossman (1989; 1992), and Joulfaian and Marlow (1990). These studies have been selected
based on the analytical framework employed and relevance of the findings to the present study.
Oates (1985) examines one ofthe testable implications ofthe decentralization hypothesis
namely, "other things being equal, the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the
extent of fiscal decentralization".
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) see a decentralized public sector as a mechanism for
limiting the growth or size ofgovernment. Oates argues that the opposite could also be true, i.e.,
increased decentralization could lead to an increase in the size ofgovernment. His argument runs
as follows. Suppose that instead of a monopolistic setting, competition among political parties
produces an outcome that conforms fairly closely to the tastes of the citizenry - as under the
conventional median-voter model. In such a competitive political environment, one would have no
reason to expect a negative association between the size ofpublic budgets and the degree offiscal
decentralization. In a centralized setting, the outcome would conform to the preferences of the
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overall median voter. If, in contrast, levels ofoutput were set independently in each jurisdiction,
the median voter in each locality would effectively choose the budget. It is impossible therefore to
determine whether the average level ofoutput in the decentralized case would exceed or fall short
of output under centralised decision making without knowing both the distribution oftastes and
the location ofthe populace.
According to Gates, one might argue for the competitive case that, from a purely
budgetary perspective, increased fiscal decentralization would typically result in a higher level of
government expenditure. Greater decentralization may result in the loss ofcertain economies of
scale with a consequent increase in costs ofadministration. That is, fiscal decentralization may be
relatively expensive in budgetary terms. Thus, a more competitive view ofthe functioning ofthe
public sector would suggest, contrary to the Leviathan model, an absence ofa positive association
between government size and fiscal centralization with the possibility that this association might
even be negative.
Using data on public finances dis-aggregated by level ofgovernment, Gates examines the
influence of fiscal decentralization on the behavior of government in 43 countries. He also
explores the association between the budgetary size ofstate and local governments and the degree
ofdecentralization ofstate-local "fisc" in each ofthe 48 states and local governments in the United
States.
As a measure of the size of the public sector in the United States case, Gates uses
aggregate state-local tax receipts in each state as a fraction ofpersonal income (G). For the extent
of state-local decentralization, Gates uses three proxy measures. These include two fiscal
centralization ratios - state share ofstate-local general revenues (R) and the state share ofstate-
local total expenditure (E) and one non-fiscal measure ofdecentralization: the absolute number of
local government units in the state (L).Gates uses this third measure because in Brennan and
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Buchanan's observation, the potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the number of
competing governmental units in the inclusive territory. The results of Gates analysis of the 48
states in the United States which are relevant to the present study are summarized in Tables 5.1-
5.3.
The results summarized in Table 5.1 show a considerable diversity in both the size of
government (G) and extent of fiscal concentration (R and E). In the case of the size of
government, the ratio varies from a high of 0.18 to a low of 0.10, with a mean of 0.12 across
states. For the centralization ratio across states, the figure varies from a maximum of 0.78 to a
minimum of 0.43 with a mean value of 0.58 on the revenue side, and from 0.59 to 0.22 and a
mean of 0.43 on the expenditure side. Likewise, the number of local governments varies from
6,620 in one state to only 120 in another state.
The results of Gates rank correlation analysis summarized in Table 5.2 show a negative
correlation between the size ofgovernment (G) and each ofthe fiscal centralization ratio ( Rand
E), indicating that a more centralized state-local sector tends to be associated with a smaller state-
local sector. Although the negative correlations established between G and each ofR and E run
counter to the prediction ofthe Leviathan hypothesis, the degree ofassociation is not sufficiently
strong in either case to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation. In contrast, the correlation
between G and the number of local governments (L), is negative, supporting the Leviathan
hypothesis, but here again the relationship is very weak. In general, Gates simple rank correlations
analysis does not produce a conclusive result.
In an attempt to control for other variables that influence the size of the public sector,
Gates undertook a number ofregression analysis. In the absence ofa fully specified model ofthe
economy he resorted to a series ofad hoc reduced-form equations using explanatory variables that
other studies have found to be of significance in explaining the size ofthe government sector.
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Table 5.3 summarizes the results ofthe regression analysis. The results ofthe first three
simple regressions are roughly consistent with that ofthe rank correlation analysis. That is, they
Table 5.1 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
G 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.02
R 0.58 0.78 0.43 0.08
E 0.43 0.59 0.22 0.08
L 1660 6620 120 1450
Source: Dates (1985)
Note: G= Total state-local tax receipts as a fraction of state personal income;
R= State share of state-local general revenues
E= State share ~f state-local total expenditures
L=Number of local government units;
Table 5.2 Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient











G1 = -1.8 - .004R
(11.5) (1.5)
G1 = -1.7- .006E*
(14.9) (2.2)





G1 = -2.9 + .0001Y* - .003P - .002U + .011* - .006R
= .32
(8.7) (3.5) (0.4) (1.7) (2.8) (1.7)
(2E) G1 = -2.8 + .0001Y* - .0002P - .002U + .0081 - .004E
=.29
(6.6) (3.1) (0.0) (2.0) (1.9) (1.0)
(2L) G1 = -3.0 + .000IY* - .008P - .002U* +.0071 -.0002L
(9.2) (3.7) (1.0) (2.1) (1.8) (1.1)
=.29
Source: Dates (1985)
Note: numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the absolute values of
the t-statistic. An asterisk indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the. 05
level (using a two-tail test).
U = Percentage ofstate's population residing within Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (SMSA)
P = Population (in millions)
Y = State personal income per capita
I = Intergovernmental grants as a percentage of state-local general revenues.
all indicate negative association of G' with R and E. The correlation of G' with L in this case
is positive but remains very weak.
In an attempt to control for the influence of other key variables on the size ofthe public
sector, Dates estimated three multiple regressions (equations 2R, 2E and 2L in Table 5.3). In all
of these equations, the level of per capita income (Y) has a positive and significant association
with the size ofthe public sector (consistent with earlier studies ofWagner's Law). Population
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size (P) exhibits a negative sign but is not significantly different from zero in any of the three
equations. The extent ofurbanization (D) is negatively related to G' and is statistically significant
in one ofthe three equations. This indicates that, other things being equal, the more urbanized is a
state, the smaller is its public sector, reflecting perhaps some economies in providing services to
more densely populated areas. The variable (1) representing the percentage ofstate-local general
revenues that comes from intergovernmental grants, comes out with a positive coefficient and
statistically significant in one equation, supporting the view that intergovernmental grants provide
a significant stimulus to expenditures by the recipient.
Ofcentral interest for the present study is the effect ofthe centralization variables on the
size ofgovernment. The fiscal centralization ratios, R and E, each exhibits a negative sign, but in
neither case can the null hypothesis ofno association be rejected. The number oflocal government
(L) also comes out with a negative sign (consistent with the Leviathan view) but with a weak
association.
Overall, the results of Dates (1985) study suggest that there does not exist a strong and
systematic relationship between the size of government and the degree of centralisation of the
public sector, pointing to the non-existence of real difference in outcomes, in terms ofwhether
Leviathan is constrained by decentralization or not.
Marlow (1988) questions the findings ofOates on two grounds. First, Marlow claims that
Dates tested the hypothesis for only a subset of total public activity, i.e., state and local versus
federal state and local. By ignoring the federal government, Dates excluded a major component of
public sector activity, which in recent years is more than one-half of the total public sector
activity. For this reason, Marlow concludes that Dates tests provide at best, weak tests of
decentralization. Second, Marlow suggests that Dates under-estimated the total impact of
government by measuring centralization using tax receipts rather than expenditures. Since
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expenditures are always balanced by total finances (taxes and debt), government expenditure
measures provide more meaningful measures of public sector size by concentrating on a more
complete measure oftotal resource absorption by government.
Grossman (1989) argues that Oates study failed to consider the collusion caveat Brennan
and Buchanan attached to their hypothesis. His evidence reaffirms Marlow's findings on
decentralization and suggests that intergovernmental grants circumvent the discipline of fiscal
federalism, contributing to the growth of government.
Grossman (1989) tests the hypothesis that intergovernmental transfers lead to an increase
in total public sector size. EmploYing an ad hoc model and drawing on variables that other studies
have found to be significant in explaining the size of the public sector, Grossman presents two
tests of hypothesis, one employing cross-sectional data for 48 contiguous states of the United
States for the period 1976-1977, and the other employing time series data for the United States
covering the period 1948 to 1984. In this study, Grossman defines the size of the of the public
sector as the ratio of state and local tax revenues to personal income (G), and the level of
intergovernmental transfers as state transfers to local governments normalized by population
(TR). To control for other factors that might influence the size of the public sector, three
additional variables are included. These are per capita income (Y), which is assumed to be
positively correlated with G; federal transfers per capita to state and local governments (FTR);
and population per multiple function government (MFG) to capture a number of influences,
including the size of population, urbanization, and a number of localities. Grossman's cross-
section statistics and regression results are summarized in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
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Table 5.4. Summary Statistics: Cross-Section Data
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
G 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.02
TR 242 592 96 92
Y 6068 7382 4530 716
FTR 302 527 189 64
MFG 10 45 2 8
Source: (rrossman(1985)
Notes: G: ratio of state and local tax revenue to personal income
TR: state transfers per capita to local government; Y: per capita income
FTR: federal transfers per capita to state and local government
MFG: population per multiple function government
















Note: absolute value oft-statistics in parentheses;
* implies significant at the 90% level, two-tailed test
** implies significant at the 95% level, two-tailed test
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Grossman's regression results provide strong evidence consistent with the hypothesis.
Column 1 of Table 5.5 presents the results of a simple linear regression of G on TR. The
coefficient of TR is positive and significant. This is consistent with the interest group hypothesis
that intergovernmental transfers increase the total size of the public sector.
Column 2 ofthe Table 5.4 reports the results for the multiple regression which are again
consistent with the hypothesis. The positive relationship between G and TR, though weak, is still
significant. The three control variables also have the expected signs, with both Y and FTR
significant. The coefficient of MFG is positive, but insignificant. The income elasticity of G is
approximately 0.22, interpreted for the mean values of the variables. In other words, a 1%
increase in per capita income leads to a 1.2% increase in total per capita taxes, which is consistent
with the standard interpretation of Wagner' s Law. The elasticity of G with respect to FTR is
greater than zero, approximately 0.31. This is also consistent with the general findings of the
intergovernmental grant literature that transfers increase the recipient government's spending.
Finally, increases in population, urbanization, and a number oflocalities composite variable MFG,
result in an increase in the relative size of government.
For the time-series analysis, Grossman defines the size of the public sector as total
(federal, state, and local) government receipts as a percentage ofGross National Product (G). The
transfer variable (TR) is defined as real federal grants-in-aid per capital. Three control variables,
viz. (1) real GNP per capita (Y) to measure the Wagner's Law; (2) the ratio ofgovernment goods
and services implicit deflator to the GNP implicit deflator (RC) to measure the productivity
differential effects; and (3) population (P) to serve as a scale variable are also included. The
summary statistics and results of the time series analysis are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7,
respectively.
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S titi T" S· DtSITab e 5.6 ummary ta s cs. tIDe enes aa
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
G 28.21 32.35 24.08 2.57
TR 114.03 230.86 28.20 71.55
Y 5070.90 6927.50 3512.20 1061.60
RC 93.02 110.80 73.19 10.33
P 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.03
Source:~os~an(1989)
. R sult15 T" S' RTab e .7. tIDe- enes egreSSIOn e S
Variable (1) (2t


















Notes: Absolute value oft-statistics in parentheses
a: all variables are in first differences
*: significant at the 90% level, two-tailed test
**: significant at the 95% level, two-tailed test
The time-series regression results provide additional evidence in support of the Leviathan
hypothesis. The coefficients for TR2 (TR lagged periods) in column 1 and TR and TR2 in column
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2 are significant at the 90% level. The coefficient for TR1 is not significant in both equations.
These results indicate that in the initial period, increased grants lead to a reduction in the size of
government. This, however, reverses in subsequent periods such that by the third period the net
effect is a positive increase in the public sector size. Ofthe control variables, all have the expected
sign but only the coefficient for Y is significant. Overall, the explanatory power of the first
differences equation is weak, explaining about 25% of the variation in G. It is, however,
significant at the 5% level.
Overall, Grossman (1989) analysis supports the hypothesis that intergovernmental
transfers results in a larger overall budget. This implies that policies designed to enhance the fiscal
independence oflower-level governments would be effective tools for controlling the growth of
the public sector, i.e., fiscal decentralization should lead to a smaller public sector.
In one ofhis recent work, Grossman (1992) examines the impact of fiscal decentralization
and intergovernmental collusion on the size of the public sector in Australia. In doing this,
Grossman estimates the following equation:
(1)
where,
SIZE = public sector size (defined as total public sector outlays as percentage of GDP)
DEC = decentralization (defines as state and local government outlays as a percentage of
total government expenditure);
GRT = fiscal dependence (defined as intergovernmental grants as a percentage of total
lower-level government's finances;
X = a matrix of control variables;
e = a random disturbance term; and
t = time.
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Table 5.8. Regression Results for Tests of the Fiscal Decentralization and
11 . H thIntergovernmental Co USlon Lypo eses
Variable 1 2 3 4
DEC 0.135 0.079 -0.001 0.120
(1.10) (0.60) (0.01) (0.86)
GRT - - 0.322* 0.349*
(2.50) (3.36)
py - - - -0.002
(1.72)
P - -0.001 - 2.552*
(0.89) (3.39)
CONSTANT 27.589* 2.262* 18.820* 4.150
(4.13) (2.57) (2.87) (0.72)
:iF 0.845 0.872 0.865 0.904
DW 1.695 1.484 1.733 1.709
RHO 0.947 0.797 0.893 0.662
Source:crrossrnan(1992)
Notes: All regressions are corrected for serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt
Technique.
Absolute value oft statistic in parentheses.
* significant at 90% level, two-tailed test
Two control variables, viz. real disposable income per capita (pYt) to test for Wagner's Law and
population (Pt) to act as a scale variable were also used. Table 5.8 reports the regression results.
Equation 1 reports the results for a simple test ofthe decentralization hypothesis. Equation
2 includes the two control variables but not GRT. The results reported in these equations offer no
support for the decentralization hypothesis. The coefficient for DEe is positive in both equations,
contrary to expectations, and not significant. The results suggest that increased fiscal
decentralization does not generate the Tiebout-style competition among State and local
governments envisioned by Brennan and Buchanan. The results are also dramatically different
from the supportive results reported for the United States by Grossman (1989).
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Of the control variables, only P is significant. The positive coefficient suggests that
government goods and services suffer from congestion problems or dis-economies of scale. The
negative, though insignificant, coefficient ofPY suggests that public sector size is mildly income
inferior.
Equations 3 and 4 give the results with GRT variable included. The coefficient ofDEC in
both equations are still not significant, providing further support for the conclusion that the
Tiebout-style competition is not a major phenomenon at the State and local level in Australia. The
positive coefficient for GRT, however, supports the fiscal dependence hypothesis. The evidence
suggests that grants do circumvent the discipline imposed on lower-level governments in a federal
system. This latter finding is consistent with those reported by Grossman (1989) for the United
States.
Oates and Grossman studies reviewed above have found an inverse relationship between
fiscal decentralization and public sector size and a positive correlation between the extent of
intergovernmental collusion and public sector size in the United States. The Australian evidence,
however, is only partially consistent with the United States findings. Fiscal decentralization is
positively correlated with public sector size, though the correlation is not significant. Fiscal
dependence, however, is positively and significantly correlated with public sector size.
Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) express some concern about Dates and Grossman studies.
According to them, these studies fall into two categories: they have either resorted to testing ofa
subset ofgovernment or have used data at their highest level of aggregation. Oates (1985) falls
into the first category and Grossman (1989: 1992) into the second. The former excludes the
federal government since it measures Leviathan as the ratio ofstate and local government activity
over some measure of income. Such definitions, however, exclude part ofthe total government
activity and are not consistent with the Brennan and Buchanan wording of "total government
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intrusions" in their decentralization hypothesis. The latter category, using time- series data,
combines state, local and federal government activity in all states into one unit ofobservation. The
down-side ofthis approach in Grossman is that it implicitly assumes that the simple-summing of
all local and state governments, along with the federal sector is appropriate. This assumption,
however, may not be appropriate in cases where the different levels ofgovernment operate under
varying fiscal constraints.
To attempt to address the shortcomings of Gates and Grossman studies, Joulfaian and
Marlow (1990) proceed to test the decentralization hypothesis by examining a data set which
considers units ofgovernments. By dis-aggregating the United States federal spending on a state-
by-state basis, they construct a cross-section of state data on federal, state and local government
activity. This brings into the analysis the activity of the federal government, which the previous
studies have excluded. Consistent with previous work, however, they model the size of
government as a function of several control variables but with two specifications of the
decentralization measure:
L = 8() + atX + a2G + a3DEC + u




L = total government expenditures (federal, net of grants plus state plus local) share of
state product (GSP) for each state;
X = control variable for each state;
G = ratio of federal grants to state and local governments revenues for each state;
DEC = ratio of state and local government expenditures to total government expenditures
for each state;
SL = number of state and local governments for each state in 1982; and
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u = random disturbance term.
Joulfaian and Marlow model as presented in equations (2) and (3) allows for an
appropriate testing of the decentralization hypothesis in four areas. First, the measure ofpublic
size (L) includes all levels of government and is therefore consistent witft the Brennan and
Buchanan hypothesis that "total government intrusion" is relevant for public sector size. Second,
all the relevant measures ofgovernment are defined in terms oftotal expenditures, rather than tax
revenues, and therefore reflect a more complete measure of total resource absorption by
government than those using revenue-based measures. Third, the model allows for the control of
the possibility that grants offset the hypothesized inverse relationship between decentralization and
government size. Fourth, is the inclusion ofthe alternative measure ofdecentralization (SL). This
measure was suggested by Oates (1989) but he did not find the hypothesized inverse relationship
with total government size. While DEC is essentially a concentration measure, SL reflects the
number of partially competing government units.
The decentralization hypothesis suggests an inverse relationship between government size
(L) and decentralization (DEC) and a positive relationship between government size (L) and
grants (G). Two control variables are included: per capita gross state product (PGSP) to control
for income effects, and population (POP) as a scale variable.
Table 5.9 displays the summary statistics of the selected variables for 50 states of the
United States, and Tables 5.10 and 5.11 the regression results for the gove~entsize equations
for 1981 and 1984, respectively. The summary statistics, especially the minimum and maximum
values, suggest substantial variations in the size ofgovernment (L), the degree ofdecentralization
(DEC), federal grants to states (G), and the number ofstate and local governments within states
(SL).
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Table 5.9. Summary Statistics
Variable Period Mean Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
L 1981 0.32 0.43 0.20 0.05
1984 0.33 0.44 0.24 0.04
DEC 1981 0.52 0.67 0.36 0.07
1984 0.50 0.74 0.33 0.08
G 1981 0.19 0.26 0.08 0.03
1984 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.03
SL 1982 1636 6467 18 1445
Source:~arlovv(1990)
Notes:
L = federal government expenditures, other than grants, and state and local expenditure as a share
ofGSP for each state
DEC =ratio of state and local government expenditures to total government expenditures for each state
G = ratio offederal grants to state and local governments revenues for each state
SL = number of state and local governments for each state
1981S' ERut£; Goa e . egressiOn es ts or iVernment lZe ~( uatiOns:
Variable 1 2 3 4
CONSTANT 0.38 0.38 0.52 0.43
(18.97) (5.41) (5.27) (6.60)
POP* -0.89 -0.86 -0.65 -2.45
(0.62) (0.55) (0.45) (1.42)
PGSP** -4.33 -4.32 -3.34 -5.08
(3.39) (2.58) (2.08) (3.32)






F 5.82 3.80 5.22 6.28
IF 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.30
SEE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
T bl 5 10 R
Source: ~arlovv(1990)
Notes: Dependent variable: federal, state and local expenditure share ofGSP
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses
* coefficients multiplied by 1000000
** coefficients multiplied by 1000
*** coefficients multiplied by 100000
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S' E ti 1984ul :6 GoTable 5.11. Regression Res ts or vemment lZe __qua ons:
Variable 1 2 3 4
CONSTANT 0.38 0.42 0.49 0.44
(16.14) (6.56) (8.05) (7.53)
POP* -1.60 -1.84 -1.86 0.28
(1.34) (1.44) (1.58) (0.18)
PGSP** -2.65 -3.24 -0.47 -3.68
(1.85) (1.91) (0.25) (2.25)






F 2.64 1.89 3.80 2.81
IF 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.13
SEE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Source:~arlovv(1990)
Notes: Dependent variable: federal, state and local government expenditure share ofGSP
Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses
* coefficients multiplied by 1000000
** coefficients multiplied by 1000
*** coefficients multiplied by 100000
The first columns of Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the relationships between the control
variables and government size. In general, the coefficients ofPOP are not statistically significant
from zero. The estimated coefficients of PGSP are negative and statistically significant for the
1981 equation and, to a lesser extent, for the 1984 equation as well. The estimated coefficients of
G in the second column are statistically not different from zero in both 1981 and 1984. They also
remained insignificant after the measures ofdecentralization were added in the third and fourth
columns. The estimated coefficients ofDEC in the third columns are statistically significant and
negative in both years. The effects ofthe PGSP are significant in 1981 but not significant in 1984.
The alternative measure ofdecentralization, SL, in the fourth column is also statistically significant
and negative in both years. Thus both the coefficients ofDEC and SL are statistically significant
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and of the expected signs in both time periods. This results support the view that fiscal
decentralization is a significant determinant oftotal government size. Joulfaian and Marlow also
contend that although their analysis present cross-sectional evidence from two time periods,
support of this hypothesis does not appear to be time sensitive.
5.3.Summary
The review ofthe three major empirical tests ofthe decentralization hypothesis has shown that, in
general:
1. Fiscal decentralization has significant and negative effect on the size ofthe public sector
(measured in terms oftotal expenditures);
2. Fiscal collusion and public sector size are positively related;
3. Increases in population or urbanization result in an increase in the relative size of the
government; and
4. Increases in income per capita have a positive and significant association with the size of
the public sector, consistent with the Wagner's Law.
The first two findings give credence to the Brennan and Buchanan hypothesis, whether tested with
cross-section or time-series data. An important thing to observe in the empirical test of this
hypothesis, however, is that the test should consider the roles ofall levels ofgovernment, i.e., the
public sector should be defined to include all levels ofgovernment.
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Chapter 6
Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa.
1\.n Empirical Analysis
6.1 The Empirical Model
This study attempts to test the Leviathan hypothesis that fiscal decentralisation in South Africa
serves as a constraint on the behaviour of revenue-maximising national government, thereby
restraining the overall size ofthe public sector. The Leviathan model predicts that, other things
being equal, the overall size of the public sector should inversely vary with the extent of
simultaneous decentralisation ofthe national government's taxing and spending decisions (fiscal
decentralisation). Furthermore, other things being equal, the decentralisation should include the
simultaneous transfer of the national government's revenue and of its spending powers to sub-
national governments (fiscal collusion) (Ehdaie, 1994).
In this study, fiscal decentralisation (FISDEC) is defined as the ratio oftotal provincial and
local government own-source revenue used to finance their expenditures to total consolidated
general government (national plus sub-national) expenditures. FISDEC is assumed to vary only
with the extent of simultaneous (de)centralisation of the national government's taxing and
spending powers. Its variation excludes changes in the decentralisation degree of expenditure
financed through sources other than the sub-national government's own-source revenues.
As a measure of fiscal collusion (FISCOL), this study uses the ratio of the national
government's transfers (grants) to provincial and local governments over the consolidated general
government expenditures. FISCOL only varies with the variation ofsimultaneous transfer ofthe
national government's revenue and assignment of its spending responsibility to provincial and
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local governments. It remains fixed with the extent of fiscal (de)centralisation. FISDEC and
FISCOL are thus independent policy variables.
As a measure of public size (pUBSIZ), this study adopts the definition employed by
Grossman (1989; 1992) and Kneebone (1992). PUBSIZ is defined as the total consolidated
general government expenditure share of the gross domestic product.
To test the fiscal decentralisation hypothesis, the level (or growth rate) of PUBSIZ is
assumed to be related to the level (or growth rate) ofFISDEC, FISCOL and a set ofother control











ratio of total consolidated general government expenditure to
GDP;
ratio ofprovincial and local governments own-source revenues to
total consolidated general government expenditure;
ratio of national government transfers to provincial and local
governments to total consolidated general government
expenditures;
a vector of other control variables (such as population, degree of
urbanisation)
disturbance term
The Leviathan fiscal decentralisation hypothesis implies that «1 < O. The sign of «2 may be
negative or positive, depending on whether the stimulating effect ofthe transfers from the national
government to the sub-national governments (revenue sharing) on the size of the public sector
exceeds or falls short of the constraining influence of the decentralised expenditures financed
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through revenue transfers. A positive sign of «2 regardless ofits significance level would indicate
that revenue sharing with tax decisions concentrated in the hands of the national government
exterminates the constraining influence of decentralisation of the spending power, providing
further support to the Leviathan hypothesis.
To control for the influence of other variables, the study uses per capita gross domestic
product (PERCAP) for Wagner's Law and total population (POP) as a scale variable. According
to the Wagner's law, demand for public goods and services is more income-elastic than demand
for private goods and services, implying a positive relationship between PUBSIZ, the demand for
public goods and services relative to the demand for public-private goods and services, and GDP
per capita. The GDP per capita also controls for the positive effect ofeconomic development on
the size of the public sector. The more developed a country, the higher would be its GDP per
capita and thus the size ofthe public sector. As regards the effect of scale variable, Oates (1985)
has argued that the more populated a country is, the smaller should be its public sector, reflecting
some economies in providing services to more densely populated areas. The counter-argument is
that growth in total population would increase the demand for public services, encouraging the
expansion ofthe public sector (Kneebone, 1992).
6.2. Monte Carlo Experiments
The least squares estimates, ab a2, and (l3, to be obtained from equation (6.1) are assumed to
have certain desirable statistical features, namely that they are best, linear and unbiased estimators
(BLUE). In practice, however, we never know whether the BLUE property holds for our
estimates. In other words, we cannot tell whether the estimates produced by equation (6.1) are
good or bad. To test whether our least square estimators are best, linear and unbiased, we
undertake some Monte Carlo experiments, which are essentially computer simulation or sampling
experiments.
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The Monte Carlo experiment proceeds in four parts as follows: In the first part, we
estimate equation (6.1) and obtain the true values of ao, aI, a2, and a3. We then select a sample
size, say 25. We fix the values ofX (i.e., FISDEC, FISCOL, and Z), to obtain 25Xvalues. Using
some random number generating process, we obtain the random factor u for each observation.
In the second part, we generate the value ofy (PUBSIZ) for each observation, using the
relationship (6.1) and the values of ao, aI, a2, a3, and u. Using the values ofythus generated and
the data for X, we use regression analysis to obtain estimates ao, aI, a2, and a3.
In the third part, we repeat the experiment 10,000 times, each time using the same ao, aI,
a2, and a3 andXvalues. We then take the averages ofthese 10,000 estimates and call them~ ~,
a2, and a3.
Finally, we compare the Monte Carlo average estimates, ao, aI, a2, and a3 to the true
values ao, aI, a2, and a3. Ifthe average estimates are about the same as the true values, then the
Monte Carlo experiments have established that the least square estimators are indeed unbiased.
6.3 Stationarity and Integration
The empirical analysis offiscal decentralisation in South Africa outlined above in section 6. 1will
require the use of quarterly time series data. In time series analysis, trends may give rise to
spurious regression results, uninterpretable t-values, and goodness offit measures which are too
high, making the regression results extremely difficult to evaluate. For this reason, it is important
to verify whether the underlying process that generates the series can be assumed to be invariant
with time. Ifthe characteristics of the stochastic process change over time, i.e., ifthe process is
non-stationary, it will be difficult to represent the time series over past and future intervals oftime
by a simple algebraic model. On the other hand, if the stochastic process is fixed in time, i.e.,
stationary, then it will be possible to model the process via an equation with fixed coefficient that
can be estimated from past data (pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991).
To avoid spurious regression by relating non-stationary to stationary data series, it is very
important to investigate the order ofintegration ofthe variables under investigation. According to
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Charemza and Deadman (1992), a non-stationary series which can be transformed to stationary
series by differencing d times is said to be integrated ofthe order d. A seriesYt integrated oforder
d is conventionally denoted as:
Yt'" I(d) (6.2)
Ifwe wish to test the hypothesis that a non-seasonal variableytis integrated ofthe order one, that
is Yt is generated by
Yt Yt-l + et (6.3)
where et represents a series of identically distributed stationary variables with zero means, a
straightforward procedure will be to test for p = 1 in an auto-regressive equation:
Yt (6.4)
Ifthe error term in equation 6.4 is a white noise process, then the equation represents a random
walk process when p = 1. But, such a process generatingytis non-stationary. However, if /p /<
1, then the process generatingYt in equation 6.4 is integrated oforder zero and is stationary. It is
possible to estimate equation 6.4 by ordinary least squares (OLS), and to test the hypothesis that
p = 1 by using the t-test. The problem with this approach is that the OLS estimate of p may be
substantially biased in an auto-regressive equation and little is known about the distribution ofthe
t-test where the variable Yt is non-stationary.
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(6.5)
An appropriate and simple method for testing the order ofintegration ofyt in equation 6.4
is to apply a unit root test (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979). The unit root test is a test of the
hypothesis that in equation 6.4, P = 1. This test is based on the estimation of an equivalent
regression equation ofthe form:
L1Yt = Oyt-1 + Ct
Equation 6.5 can also be expressed as
Yt (1 + 0)Yt-1 + Ct (6.6)
which is the same as equation 6.4 with p = (1 + 4>.
If 0 < 0 in equation 6.5 or 6.6, it implies that p < 1 in equation 6.4. The Dickey-Fuller
(DF) test consists oftesting the negativity of oin the OLS regression in equation 6.6. Ifwe reject
the null hypothesis: 0 = 0, in favour of the alternative: 0 < 0, it implies that p < 1, and thatYt is
integrated of the order zero. This means that the variable Yt is stationary or the structural
relationship described by equation 6.4 is invariant with time (Charernza and Deadman, 1992).
Time series Xt andYt are said to be co-integrated ofthe order d, b where d ~ b ~ O.
This is written as:
XtYt'" C/(d, b) (6.7)
Ifboth series are integrated ofthe order d, then there exists a linear combination ofthe variables.
Ifthe variables are not co-integrated, then we may be estimating a spurious regression because of
the presence of stochastic or deterministic trends in the data.
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According to Granger and Engle (1985), there are two major principles to observe in
testing for co-integration ofvariables in a long run relationship. First, iftwo variables appear in a
long run relation, then both variables have to be ofthe same order ofintegration. Ifthe number of
variables is greater than two, i.e., if there are more than one explanatory variables, the order of
integration ofthe dependent variable cannot be higher than the order ofintegration ofany ofthe
explanatory variables. Second, there must be either none or at least two explanatory variables
integrated to an identical order ofintegration ofthe dependent variable. For example, ifwe have
(6.8)
where Yt, Xt, are vectors, the Granger-Engle (1985) procedure requires for:
(i) a test for the order of integration ofYt and the elements of Xt by means of the DF and
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics;
(ii) a test for the presence of co-integration betweenYt and Xt by means ofADF statistics.
To undertake these tests, a function ofthe form:
(6.9)
is estimated. Thereafter, we apply the standard diagnostic tests. Like any other test, this approach
has its own problems. First, the test statistics will be slightly different in each application, hence
the critical values suggested by Granger and Engle (1985) are rough guides only. Second, where
there is a vector of n variables, there may be up to (N - 1) co-integrating vectors. In this case,
there is no guarantee that the Granger-Engle (1985) or Engle-Y00 (1986) procedure will give an
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estimate ofa unique co-integrating vector, i.e., the OLS estimate ofthe co-integrated relationship
may be linear combination of two or more co-integrating vectors.
6.4 Data Sources
Data used for both the unit root tests and econometric analysis were obtained from the June 1992
to September 1998 issues of the Reserve Bank of South Africa (RBSA) Quarterly Bulletin.
(Refer to Annexure E) In addition to data on monetary aggregates, the RBSA QuarterlyBulletin
contains statistics on all aspects ofgovernment finance namely, exchequer account, main central
government budget, extra-budgetary institutions, consolidated central government finances,
provincial government and local authorities finances, consolidated general government
expenditure. The Bulletin also contains statistics on national accounts, both in current and
constant terms, data on international trade and balance of payments, and general economic
indicators.
6.5. Stationarity and Integration Results
The Shazaam computer programme was used to conduct the stationarity and integration 'tests.
Summary results ofour stationarity and integration analysis are presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2,
whilst detailed computer printouts are included in annexure A. The entries in Table 6.1 showthat
in both the Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, the calculated unit root statistics
are greater than their corresponding critical values. For the unit root test in levels, the calculated
Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics are -3.0684 and -2.9175 compared with the
critical value of -4.9112. For the test in logarithm, the calculated statistics are -3.2440 and -
2,5203 for the Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, respectively, compared with the
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critical value of -4.9122. For the unit root test in growth rates, the Dickey-Fuller statistic is -
2.6683 and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, -2.9608, both of which are greater than the critical
value of -4.9122. The three tests all leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity and the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis of stationarity in all the variables.
1998/1999
Table 6.1. Stationarity Analysis
I . d nd 1993/1994 2ndSamp. e peno : 2 Quarter to quarter















PUBSIZ on INPT, FISDEC, FISCaL, PERCAP, -3.2440
I
-2.5203 I -4.9122 IpoP
In Growth Rates
PUBSIZ on INPT, FISDEC, FISCaL, PERCAP, -2.6683
I
-2.9608 1 -4.9122 IpoP
Source: Annexure A
The entries in Table 6.2 show that for the variable PUBSIZ in levels, both the calculated DF and
ADF statistics are smaller than the critical values for both the regression equations. For the
regression equation with intercept and trend, the t-value for the DF test is -7.9712 and for ADF
test, the t-value is -4.5875 compared with the critical t-value of -3.0522. For the regression
equation with intercept and no trend, the calculated t-value for both the DF and ADF are
respectively, given as -7.4349 and -3.8644, each smaller than the critical t-value of -3.7119.
Although the entries show that the t-values in the DF and ADF tests in both equations for the
FISDEC, FISCOL, PERCAP and POP variables exceed the critical value, i.e., are significant, the
non-significance ofthe dependent variable, PUBSIZ, in both tests and for both equations indicates
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the time series of the variables.
84
Table 6.2. Co-integration Test
nd 1993/1994 2nd art 1998/1999Sample period: 2 quarter - qu er
Variable Unit Root Test
with intercept and trend with intercept and no trend
DF ADF 95% critical DF ADF 95% critical
value value
In Levels
PUBSIZ -7.9712 -4.5875 -3.0522 -7.4349 -3.8644 -3.7119
FISDEC -2.7122 -1.5998 -3.0522 -4.3325 -3.612 -3.7119
FISCaL -3.5041 -1.9596 -3.0522 -4.9399 -2.0057 -3.7119
PERCAP -1.0069 -0.9721 -3.0522 -0.9830 -1.0085 -3.7119
POP 2.6208 1.1893 -3.0522 0.8003 -1.1738 -3.7119
In Logarithm
PUBSIZ -7.1987 -3.9580 -3.0522 -6.7746 -3.3809 -3.7119
FISDEC -2.6735 -1.6086 -3.0522 -4.5330 -3.4183 -3.7119
FISCaL -3.9957 -2.7546 -3.0522 -5.2048 -2.1989 -3.7119
PERCAP -1.8269 -1.6494 -3.0522 -0.4466 -0.3999 -3.7119
pop 2.9691 1.2170 -3.0522 0.7796 -1.1852 -3.7119
In Growth Rates
PUBSIZ -6.8123 -3.4225 -3.0522 -5.0925 -3.2164 -3.7119
FISDEC -2.6598 -1.6116 -3.0819 -4.2101 -3.1058 -3.7612
FISCaL -4.1926 -3.2545 -3.0819 -4.8589 -1.3257 -3.7612
PERCAP -1.7596 -1.4507 -3.0819 0.0760 -0.0312 -3.7612
pop 2.1583 1.1328 -3.0819 0.7008 -1.2116 -3.7612
Source: Annexure B
In logarithm terms, the DF and ADF tests for the PUBSIZ variable for the equation with
intercept and trend are not significant, although the tests for the other variables (except the DF
test for FISCaL) are all significant. In the equation with intercept and no trend, the DF test for
PUBSIZ, FISDEC and FISCaL are not significant, but the DF tests for PERCAP and POP are
significant. For the ADF test, however, the entries show that all the variables, including PUBSIZ,
are significant as the calculated t-value for each variable exceeds the critical value. For this
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equation, therefore, the null hypothesis ofa unit root can be rejected for the time series ofall the
variables, i.e., the variables are co-integrated ofthe order zero.
The tests for co-integration in terms ofgrowth rates al~o produce the same results as that
produced in terms of logarithms. For the regression with intercept and trend, both the DF and
ADF tests show that the variables PUBSIZ and FISCaL are not significant while the variables
FISDEC, PERCAP and pop are significant. For the equation with intercept and no trend, DF test
for PUBSIZ, FISDEC and FISCaL are not significant while the other variables are significant.
For the ADF test, however, all the variables, including PUBSIZ, are significant.
The test results analysed above indicate that a regression of PUBSIZ on FISDEC,
FISCaL, PERCAP, and POP, with an intercept and no trend, and estimated in logarithm or
growth rate terms will not produce spurious results since the variables will be co-integrated.
6.6. OLS Regression Results
The estimation results ofequation 6.1 in logarithms and in growth rates are presented in
Table 6.3. Quarterly data for the period 1993/94 to second quarter 1998/99 were used. The
shazam computer package was also used to estimate the equation. Refer to annexure C and D
the computer printouts generated utilising shazam computer package.
The entries in Table 6.3 show that the explanatory power (adjusted R2 ), of the two
regressions is fairly similar. However, regression 1 produces better results than regression 2, in
terms of the number of significant variables associated with the size of the public sector. Our
discussion ofthe empirical analysis will therefore be based on the results produced by regression
1.
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epen en ana e:
Explanation Variable In Logarithm In Growth Rates











F (4, 17) 10.43 10.34
AdjustedR2 0.64 0.65
Table 6.3. OLS Estimation Results
Sample period: 1st quarter 1993/94 to 2nd quarter 1998/1999
D d tV . bl PUBSIZ
Source Annexure C
* significant at 5% level (critical value for DF=18 is 2.101)
** significant at 10% level (critical value for DF=18 is 1.734)
t-values in parentheses
Consistent with the Wagner's law, the level ofper capita income (pERCAP) has a positive
sign in both equations, but statistically, has significant association with the size ofthe public sector
(PUBSIZ). This means that as the South African society develops and income per capita rises, the
demand for public goods and services correspondingly rise. An attempt to meet the increasing
demand for its goods and services will course the size of the public sector to expand, i.e.,
expenditure of the consolidated general government increases relative to the gross domestic
mcome.
The results also show that the overall size of the South African population (POP) is
inversely related to the size ofthe public sector, being significantly different from zero at the 10%
probability level. For this equation, a 1% increase in the size ofthe population will cause a 3.3%
contraction in the size ofthe public sector, supporting the argument that as population increases,
economies in providing services are reaped, thereby constraining the size ofthe public sector.
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As hypothesised, fiscal decentralisation (FISDEC) exerts a negative influence on the size
ofthe public sector, although the impact is statistically not different from zero at 10% probability
level. The insignificance ofthe impact offiscal decentralisation on the size ofthe public sector is
explained in terms of the fact that there has, in fact, been very little decentralisation in South
Africa. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the size ofthe provincial and local government own source
revenue relative to the consolidated general government expenditure is very little, pointing to the
serious lack ofrevenue raising powers by the sub-national governments and thus the absence of
any meaningful extent ofdecentralisation.
Finally, the coefficient ofthe fiscal-collusion variable (FISCOL) is negative but statistically
significant at 5% probability level. For this result, a 10% increase in own source revenue relative
to total national and sub-national expenditures will cause a 4.2% contraction in the size of the
public sector. That is, the size ofthe public sector will reduce ifprovinces and local authorities are
granted enough power to raise their own revenues. The increase in own source revenue can come
about as a result ofdecentralisation from the national level ofgovernment. Such decentralisation
would create a better link between revenue and expenditure. The disjunction between expenditure
and revenue has been ide~tified in public finance literature as one ofthe ineluctable sources of
government failure. Where revenues that sustain expenditure activity are mobilised by one level
ofgovernment and the expenditure are undertaken by another level ofgovernment, inefficiencies
such as overexpenditure are encouraged because costs are disconnected from revenues that
sustain them. Under these conditions, even if possibilities exist for lowering of cost functions,
raising productivity or realising economies of scale, these opportunities are less likely to be
exploited fully by subnational governments. This result, which is inconsistent with the Leviathan
hypothesis, indicates that the massive transfers of revenue from the national government to the
provinces and local authorities (revenue sharing) significantly reinforces the expanding influence
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ofthe decentralised expenditures financed through revenue transfers. For instance, transfers from
national to subnational government amounted to R40,2 billion in 1993/94. The figure increased to
R45,8 billion in 1994/95, R65,8 billion in 1995/96 and R84,8 billion in 1996/97. By 1997/98, the
transfers had reduced to R86,9 billion (DOF: Budget Review 1998). In other words, the
centralisation of revenue-raising powers contributes to the inability of transfers to neutralise the
constraining influence of decentralised expenditures financed by them.
6.7 Results of Monte Carlo Experiments
The results ofthe Monte Carlo experiments are summarized in Table 6.4. Refer to annexure D
for the detailed computer printouts generated using the shazam package. The result of the
experiment with sample size 10 generally shows over-estimation of the parameters and large
standard errors compared to the results presented in column 1 ofTable 6.3. The result shows an
overestimation of the coefficient ofFISDEC by 0.01, FISCOL by 0.04, PERCAP by 0.18 and
POP by 1.26. The results of the sample sizes of 15 and above generally turned out quite well,
although none of the coefficients is significant.
For the variable FISDEC, the coefficients produced by the Monte Carlo experiments range
between -0. 15 and -0. 17, compared to the true estimate of -0.16. The estimated standard errors
also range between 1.91 and 1.88 for the sample sizes 15 and 22, and 0.86 and 0.65 for sample
sizes 60 and 99, compared with standard error O. 11 in annexure C. This means that the
experiments over-estimated the standard errors, although the over-estimation reduces as the
sample size increases.
For the variable FISCaL, the coefficients produced by the experiments range between -
0.42 and -0.43 compared with the true estimate of-0.42. For the standard errors, the experiments
produced between 0.55 and 0.48 for sample sizes 60-99 and between 1.26 and 1.77 for sample
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sizes 15-22. Again these figures over-estimate the true standard error of 0.07 in annexure C
Table 6.4. MONTE CARLO EXPERllvIENTAL RESULTS
VARIABLE B ASE ESE T STDSE N
CONSTANT 13.15 241.04 229.65 0.06 74.16
FISDEC -0.17 2.65 2.49 -0.07 0.80
FISCOL -0.46 1.89 1.77 -0.26 0.57
PERCAP 0.87 18.30 17.30 0.05 5.59
POP -4.55 105.76 100.45 -0.05 32.44 10
CONSTANT 10.94 159.40 154.89 0.07 35.22
FISDEC -0.16 1.95 1.91 -0.08 0.44
FISCOL -0.42 1.57 1.53 -0.27 0.35
PERCAP 0.75 6.77 6.56 0.11 1.49
POP -3.69 55.81 54.22 -0.07 12.33 15
CONSTANT 9.14 79.43 78.05 0.12 13.39
-
FISDEC -0.17 1.91 1.88 -0.09 0.32
FISCaL -0.42 1.28 1.26 -0.33 0.22
PERCAP 0.65 4.86 4.77 0.14 0.82
POP -2.93 29.76 29.19 -0.10 5.01 22
CONSTANT 10.20 25.53 25.69 0.40 2.43
FISDEC -0.15 0.85 0.86 -0.18 0.08
FISCaL -0.42 0.55 0.55 -0.76 0.05
PERCAP 0.69 0.87 0.87 0.79 0.08
POP -3.33 6.10 6.13 -0.54 0.58 60
CONSTANT 10.27 20.37 20.35 0.50 1.48
FISDEC -0.16 0.65 0.65 -0.24 0.05
FISCaL -0.43 0.48 0.48 -0.89 0.03
PERCAP 0.69 0.77 0.77 0.89 0.06
POP -3.34 4.94 4.93 -0.68 0.36 99
Source: Annexure D
B is the average parameter estimate
ASE is the standard deviation of the parameter estimate
ESE is the average standard error
T is test-values
STDSE is the standard deviation of the standard errors
For the PERCAP variable, the Monte Carlo experiments estimated coefficients between
0.65 and 0.75, compared to the true estimate of 0.69. Here again, the larger the sample size, the
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closer the experimental results become good estimates ofthe true value. In fact for sample sizes
60 and 99, the estimates produced by the experiments are just equal to the true estimate. Like
FISDEC and FISCOL, the experiments over-estimated the standard error for the PERCAP
variable.
The coefficients estimated by the Monte Carlo experiments range between -3.69 and
-2.93 for the variable POP, compared to the true estimate of -3.29. The standard error of the
estimate was however over-estimated by the experiments.
Generally, the estimates of the Monte Carlo experiments are very close to the true
estimates, suggesting that the true estimates are unbiased and could therefore be used as basis for
inferences.
6.8 Summary
Our econometric investigation has shown that:
As the South African society develops, per capita income rises and this will influence the
demand for public goods and services.
The overall size of the population is inversely related to the size of the public sector,
supporting the argument that as population increases, economies in providing services are
reaped.
Fiscal decentralisation exerts a negative influence on the size ofthe public sector, although
the impact is statistically not significant. The insignificance of the impact of fiscal
decentralisation on the size ofthe public sector is explained in terms ofthe fact that there
has, in fact, been very little decentralisation in South Africa.
Fiscal-collusion is a significant factor influencing the size ofthe public sector. For example
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a 10% increase in own source revenue relative to total national and sub-national
expenditures will cause a 4.2% contraction in the size ofthe public sector. That is, the size
of the public sector will reduce if provinces and local authorities are granted enough





This study sets out to review the international experience offiscal decentralization and assess the
impact offiscal decentralization on the size ofthe public sector. The major findings include the
following: The experiences ofthe countries reviewed indicate that the system offiscal federalism
has not only been implemented in a uniform way but has also evolved over time and is being
improved. In Australia, for instance, the federal government is constitutionally required to follow
regionally differentiated policies. While the Commonwealth has the financial power to exert
considerable influence on the behavior ofsub-national governments, efforts have been directed to
achieving better cooperation and coordination ofpolicy by involving the sub-national governments
in the important policy decisions.
The cooperation in the Australian federation is also strengthened by the existence of
Commonwealth Grants Commission that operates under terms of reference set by the
Commonwealth after consultation with states and territories. The coordinate-authority model of
the Canadian federation has a strong constitutional basis, a fairly strong state influence on federal
policy making. An important characteristic of the federation is that it has proven to be flexible
and has allowed for the continued evolution ofthe system to accommodate new innovations and
changes.
The German system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has a number offlaws, such as
the mismatch between revenue-raising and expenditure that reduce its efficiency and impinge on
interregional equity. These flaws result from the strict interpretation ofthe uniformity ofliving
93
conditions mandated by the German Constitution. In spite ofthis negative element, the German
fiscal federal relations have created a high degree ofhomogeneity in terms ofregional availability
ofpublic infrastructure and government services.
The Brazilian system allows states and, to a lesser extent municipalities substantial own
revenue-raising powers fostering fiscal responsibility and political accountability for their
budgetary policies.
7.2 South African Fiscal Federalism
The South African system offiscal federalism compares favourably with that ofAustralia,
Canada, Germany and Brazil. The assignment of expenditure as envisaged by the South African
Constitution is in line with that of the four countries reviewed and has also beeh implemented
correctly. Although revenue assignment is sufficiently provided for in the Constitution, in practice
revenue assignment has been skewed against subnational governments. This has rendered
subnational governments to administrative arms of national government. The imposition of
restrictions to provincial revenue raising through taxation and borrowing deprives provinces the
right to make decisions on spending priorities.
The empirical analysis of the South African fiscal ~ecentralization show that (1) as the
South African society develops and income per capita rises, the demand for public goods and
services correspondingly rise, i. e., expenditure ofthe consolidated general government increases
relative to the gross domestic income; (2) the overall size of the South African population is
inversely related to the size ofthe public sector that is an increase in the size ofthe population will
cause a contraction in the size of the public sector, supporting the argument that as population
increases, economies in providing services are reaped, thereby constraining the size ofthe public
sector; (3) although not statistically significant, fiscal decentralisation appears to exert a negative
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influence on the size of the public sector and (4) an increase in own source revenue relative to
total national and sub-national expenditures will cause a contraction in the size of the public
sector. That is, the size of the public sector will reduce, if provinces and local authorities are
granted enough power to raise their own revenues.
7.3 Policy Proposals
The shortcomings ofthe South African fiscal federalism are rooted on the insufficient powers of
the provinces to raise their own source revenue. This is due to the failure to implement in full the
recommendations ofthe FFC in the application ofrevenue sharing formula proposed by the FFC.
Because ofthe size ofthe concurrent functions it is necessary that minimum national standards be
determined both in terms ofquantity and quality. Such a determination will ensure that equitable
services are delivered throughout the country and that the equitable share of revenue provides
adequate funding for these functions. Provision for minimum standards through the equitable
share will also eliminate provincial disparities that give rise to 'interprovincial spill-overs. As
provinces begin to satisfy the basic social needs within their jurisdictions, communities will no
longer find it necessary to utilize services from other provinces.
The most important element of the FFC revenue sharing formula that requires urgent
attention relates to the granting ofthe surcharge on personal income tax:. Such a surcharge will
not only put more revenue in the coffers of provincial governments, but will also enhance the
cooperation between spheres ofgovernment. Further, improvements in provincial own source
revenue through a systematic and controlled approach discourages provinces from pursuing
revenue items that will be detrimental to the stabilization efforts of the national government.
Adequate funding of provincial governments will provide provinces with the ability to ensure
political transparency, provide efficient public services, promote good health and education ofthe
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citizens ofthe country and create a favorable climate for stable economic growth. For their part,
provinces need to design expenditure priorities that are in line with the expectation of their
respective communities thereby convincing national government that spending is carefully
targeted. Also, provinces need to build sufficient capacity to deal with expenditure management.
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Annexure A
Unit root tests for residuals
******************************************************************************
Based on OLS regression ofPUBSIZ on:
[NPT FISDEC1 FISCOL1 PERCAP1 POP1
21used for estimation from 1994Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
OF -3.0684 22.6516 21.6516 21.2975 21.6553
ADF(l) -2.9175 23.3039 21.3039 20.5958 21.3114
ADF(2) -2.4840 23.3658 20.3658 19.3038 20.3772
ADF(3) -1.9388 23.3689 19.3689 17.9528 19.3840
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -4.9122
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for residuals
******************************************************************************
Based on OLS regression ofPUBSIZ on:
INPT FISDEC2 FiSCOL2 PERCAP2 POP2
21 observations used for estimation from 1994Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
OF -3.2440 22.5019 21.5019 21.1479 21.5057
ADF(l) -2.5203 22.5387 20.5387 19.8306 20.5462
ADF(2) -2.5385 22.9663 19.9663 18.9042 19.9776
ADF(3) -1.6403 23.1973 19.1973 17.7812 19.2124
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -4.9112
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for residuals
:*****************************************************************************
3ased on OLS regression ofPUBSIZ on:
NPT FISDEC3 FISCOL3 PERCAP3 POP3
~1 observations used for estimation from 1994Q2 to 1999Q2.
:*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
)F -2.6683 18.6390 17.6390 17.3565 17.6971
\DF(l) -2.9608 19.6099 17.6099 17.0449 17.7260
\DF(2) -2.0958 19.6106 16.6106 15.7632 16.7848
\DF(3) -1.6821 19.6223 15.6223 14.4924 15.8545
:*****************************************************************************
)5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -4.9122
.JL = Maximum log-likelihood AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
;BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Annexure B
Unit root tests for variable PUBSIZ1
'he Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
*****************************************************************************
7 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
:ample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
)F -7.9712 64.0557 62.0557 61.2224 61.9728
illF(l) -4.5875 66.3210 63.3210 62.0712 63.1968
illF(2) -5.5805 69.1229 65.1229 63.4565 64.9572
illF(3) -4.3657 69.2897 64.2897 62.2006 64.0826
*****************************************************************************
'5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
,L = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
:BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable PUBSIZ1
'he Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
*****************************************************************************
7 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
:ample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL. AlC SBC HQC
>F -7.4349 ·64.0765 61.0765 59.8267 60.9523
illF(l) -3.8644 66.4496 62.4496 60.7832 62.2840
lDF(2) -4.7768 69.1366 64.1366 62.0536 63.9296
lDF(3) -3.6870 69.2903 63.2903 60.7906 63.0418
*****************************************************************************
5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.7119
.L = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable FISDEC1
fhe Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -2.7122 52.2650 50.2650 49.4924 50.2254
ADF(l) -1.5998 52.2659 49.2659 48.1070 49.2065
ADF(2) -1.5272 53.2175 49.2175 47.6724 49.1384
ADF(3) -1.3600 53.4754 48.4754 46.5439 48.3765
******************************************************************************
;)5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable FISDEC1
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
,*****************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -4.3325 52.3975 49.3975 48.2386 49.3382
WF(1) -3.612 '53.5171 48.5171 46.9719 48.4380
IDF(2) -1.5525 53.2681 48.2681 46.3366 48.1692
IDF(3) -1.5124 53.4975 47.4975 45.1797 47.3788
~*****************************************************************************
~5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7119
~L = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
~BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable FISCOL1
~he Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
*****************************************************************************
7 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
:ample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
)F -3.5041 20.9173 18.9173 18.0841 18.8345
mF(l) -1.9596 26.5921 22.5921 20.9257 22.4265
ffiF(2) -1.9561 29.7085 24.7085 22.6254 24.5014
\DF(3) -1.3715 36.3657 30.3657 27.8661 30.1173
:*****************************************************************************
15% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
.IL =Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
:BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable FISCOL1
~he Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
*****************************************************************************
7 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
:ample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
)F -4.939924.4145 21.4145 20.1646 21.2902
illF(1) -2.0057 27.0420 23.0420 21.3755 22.8763
illF(2) -2.2941 27.8415 22.8415 20.7585 22.6345
illF(3) -1.0187 29.8401 23.8401 21.3404 23.5916
*****************************************************************************
5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.7119
,L =Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable PERCAP1
rhe Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
l7 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
~ample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -1.0069 -103.3857 -105.3857 -106.2190 -105.4686
IDF(I) -.97209 -103.3811 -106.3811 -107.6309 -106.5053
IDF(2) -1.1234 -102.7894 -106.7894 -108.4558 -106.9550
IDF(3) -10-.0888 -102.5132 -107.5132 -109.5963 -107.7203
~*****************************************************************************
~5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
LL =Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Unit root tests for variable PERCAP1
fhe Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
t
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF -.98297 -102.9288 -105.9288 -107.1786 -106.0530
IDF(l) -1.0085 -102.8484 -106.8481 -108.5146 -107.0138
IDF(2) -.44117 -102.6984 -107.6984 -109.7814 -107.9055
IDF(3) -.83199 -102.0754 -108.0754 -110.5750 -108.3238
~*****************************************************************************
~5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7119
~L = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable POP 1
fhe Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
~ample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
)F 2.6208 75.9761 73.9761 73.2035 73.9365
illF(l) 1.18934 80.2233 77.2233 76.6793 76.1640
illF(2) 1.14038 80.2245 76.2245 74.6793 76.1454
illF(3) 1.07220 80.4644 75.4644 73.5330 75.3655
~*****************************************************************************
)5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.0522
~L = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
;BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable POP1
l'he Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend J
:***********************************************************~*****************
,7 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
;ample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
:*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
)F .800262 76.0086 73.0086 71.8498 72.9493
~F(1) -1.173882.1728 78.1728 76.6277 78.0937
~F(2) -1.8827 83.6801 78.6801 76.7486 78.5812
illF(3) -2.3969 85.1068 79.1068 76.7890 78.9881
******************~**********************************************************
5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7119
,L = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
BC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable PUBSIZ2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
******************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -7.1987 25.4487 23.4487 22.6155 23.3659
ADF(l) -3.9580 27.8484 24.8484 23.5985 24.7241
ADF(2) -5.0786 30.8241 26.8241 25.1577 26.6585
ADF(3) -3.9220 30.9818 25.9818 23.8988 25.7748
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable PUBSIZ2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend . J
************************************************************~*****************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
OF -6.7746 25.4758 22.4758 21.2260 22.3515
ADF(I) -3.3809 27.9503 23.9503 22.2838 23.7846
ADF(2) -4.4263 30.8396 25.8396 23.7566 25.6326
ADF(3) -3.4002 ·30;9845 . 24.9845 22.4849 24.7361
******************************************************************************
95%· critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.7119
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable FISDEC2
fhe Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
L7 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -2.6735 9.0655 7.0655 6.2323 6.9827
ADF(1) -1.6086 9.4207 6.4207 5.1708 6.2964
ADF(2) -1.1833 9.5281 5.5281 3.8617 5.3624
ADF(3) -.46059 14.0143 9.0143 6.9312 8.8072
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC =Hannan-Quinn Criterion
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Unit root tests for variable FISDEC2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
******************************************************************************I
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
OF -4.5330 13.4595 10.4595 9.2097 10.3353
ADF(l) -3.4183 13.5650 9.5650 7.8986 9.3993
ADF(2) -3.3677 14.4655 9.4655 7.3825 9.2585
ADF(3) -1.5907 15.6730 9.6730 7.1733 9.4245
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7119
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable FISCOL2
rhe Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -3.9957 4.6787 2.6787 1.8455 2.5959
ADF(1) -2.7546 11.6801 8.6801 7.4303 8.5559
ADF(2) -2.7081 11.8101 7.8101 6.1437 7.6444
ADF(3) -2.1171 13.9336 8.9336 6.8506 8.7265
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Unit root tests for variable FISCOL2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
************************************************************~*****************
I
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
OF -5.2048 7.7822 4.7822 3.5324 4.6580
ADF(1) -2.1989 11.9327 7.9327 6.2662 7.7670
ADF(2) -2.2936 12.3904 7.3904 5.3073 7.1833
ADF(3) -1.1352 13.9478 7.9478 5.4482 7.6994
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.7119
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable PERCAP2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -1.8269 55.9078 53.9078 53.0746 53.8250
ADF(l) -1.6494 55.9123 52.9123 51.6625 52.7881
ADF(2) -1.9355 56.6643 52.6643 50.9979 52.4986
ADF(3) -1.6221 57.1084 52.1084 50.0254 51.9014
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic == -3.0522
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC == Akaike Information Criterion
SBC == Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC == Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable PERCAP2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
******************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -.44661 55.9336 52.9336 51.6838 52.8094
ADF(l) -.39989 55.9337 51.9337 50.2672 51.7680
ADF(2) .48921 57.0150 52.0150 49.9320 51.8079
ADF(3) .096456 57.1530 51.1530 48.6534 50.9045
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7119
LL == Maximum log-likelihood AlC == Akaike Information Criterion
SBC == Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC == Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable POP2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
******************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF 2.9691 81.1271 79.1271 78.2939 79.0443
ADF(l) 1.2170 85.6736 82.6736 81.4237 82.5493
ADF(2) 1.1654 85.6736 81.6736 80.0072 81.5080
ADF(3) 1.1620 85.9709 80.9709 78.8879 80.7638
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.0522
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable POP2
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
******************************************************************************
t17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
OF .779622 81.2130 78.2130 76.9632 78.0888
ADF(l) -1.1852 87.7112 83.7112 82.0448 83.5456
ADF(2) -1.8384 89.0568 84.0568 81.9737 83.8497
ADF(3) -2.2224 90.1642 84.1642 81.6645 83.9157
******************************************************************************
;)5% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7119
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable PUBSIZ3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
******************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -6.8123 11.0587 9.0587 8.0007 9.4428
ADF(I) -3.4225 12.3810 9.3810 8.9942 9.0120
ADF(2) -2.4805 13.1229 9.1229 7.4565 9.6495
ADF(3) -1.3557 13.5897 10.5897 7.2566 9.0826
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0522
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable PUBSIZ3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
******************************************************************************J
i17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -5.0925 17.0763 16.0763 15.3267 15.0523
ADF(I) -3.2164 17.8581 16.8581 15.7532 14.2840
ADF(2) -1.7768 18.1376 16.1376 16.0006 14.9296
ADF(3) -1.2870 18.2903 16.2903 16.7922 14.0413
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.7119
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable FISDEC3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
******************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
































95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0819
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC =Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable FISDEC3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
******************************************************************************
117 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -4.2101 11.1145 8.1145 7.0524 8.1258
ADF(l) -3.1058 11.1835 7.1835 5.7674 7.1986
ADF(2) -3.0915 12.0603 7.0603 5.2902 7.0792
ADF(3) -1.3003 13.3338 7.3338 5.2096 7.3564
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7612
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable FISCOL3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
******************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -4.1926 5.5795 3.5795 2.8714 3.5870
ADF(I) -3.2545 12.5513 9.5513 8.4892 9.5626
ADF(2) -3.1250 12.6457 8.6457 7.2296 8.6608
ADF(3) -2.5231 13.7904 8.7904 7.0203 8.8093
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0819
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable FISCOL3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
******************************************************************************
(
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF -4.8589 7.8300 4.8300 3.7679 4.8413
ADF(l) -1.3257 12.6454 8.6454 7.2293 8.6605
ADF(2) -1.2076 12.6822 7.6822 5.9121 7.7010
ADF(3) . -.041151 14.6922 8.6922 6.5680 8.7148
***********************.*******************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.7612
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable PERCAP3
[he Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
OF -1.7596 49.1041 47.1041 46.3960 47.1116
ADF(l) -1.4507 49.1539 46.1539 44.0919 46.1653
ADF(2) -1.5618 49.6775 45.6775 44.2613 45.6..925
ADF(3) -1.4167 50.2480 45.2480 43.4779 45.2668
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.0819
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable PERCAP3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
******************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF .075975 49.1475 46.1475 45.0854 46.1588
ADF(l) -.031209 49.1604 45.1604 43.7443 45.1755
ADF(2) .77172 50.2432 45.2432 43.4731 45.2621
ADF(3) .34161 50.3947 44.3947 42.2705 46.7532
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7612
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan~Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable POP3
fhe Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
~*****************************************************************************
17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions
Sample period from 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
~*****************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF 2.1583 70.7724 68.7724 68.0643 68.7799
ADF(1) 1.1328 74.7833 71.7833 70.7212 71.7946
ADF(2) 1.0888 74.7893 70.7893 69.3732 70.8044
ADF(3) .94557 74.9726 69.9726 68.2025 69.9915
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics = -3.0819
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root test for variable POP3
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
******************************************************************************
I17 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period for 1995Q2 to 1999Q2
******************************************************************************
Test Statistic LL AlC SBC HQC
DF .70078 70.7858 67.7858 66.7237 72.7971
ADF(l) -1.2116 76.7199 72.7199 71.3038 72.7350
ADF(2) -1.9298 78.3447 73.3447 71.5746 73.3636
ADF(3) -2.5007 79.9328 73.9328 71.8086 73.9554
******************************************************************************
95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.7612
LL = Maximum log-likelihood AlC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC =Hannan-Quinn Criterion
ILE INPUT SIPHO.IN
fIT 80 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: SIPHO.IN
AMPLE 122
EAD Y Xl X2 X3 X4 / LIST





















































































































LS Y Xl X2 X3 X4 / MAX
QUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 3 CURRENT PAR= 500
S ESTIMATION
DBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARlABLE = Y
OTE..SAMPLE RANGE SET TO: 1, 22
;QUARE = 0.7104 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6423
RIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.32870E-02
\NDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.57332E-0 1
VI OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 0.55879E-01
AN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.3416
J OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 34.5150
DEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE JUDGE ET AL. (1985,P.242)
t\IKE (1969) FINAL PREDICTION ERROR - FPE = 0.40341E-02
"PE IS ALSO KNOWN AS AMEMIYA PREDICTION CRITERION - PC)
0.42538E-02
0.42423E-02
AKAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = -5.5211
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = -5.2731
MODEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE RAMANATHAN (1992,P.167)
CRAVEN-WAHBA (1979)
GENERALIZED CROSS VALIDATION - GCV =
HANNAN AND QUINN (1979) CRITERION =
RICE (1984) CRITERION = 0.46566E-02
SHIBATA (1981) CRITERION = 0.36945E-02
SCHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - SC = 0.51277E-02
AKAIKE (1974) INFORMATION CRITERION - AIC = 0.40016E-02
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - FROM MEAN
SS DF MS
REGRESSION 0.13709 4. 0.34272E-Ol
ERROR 0.55879E-Ol 17. 0.32870E-02
TOTAL 0.19297 21. 0.91889E-02
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - FROM ZERO
SS DF MS
REGRESSION 120.76 5. 24.153
ERROR 0.55879E-0 1 17. 0.32870E-02





































VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX OF COEFFICIENTS
XI 0.54025E-02
X2 -0.15065E-02 0.11894E-0 1
X3 -0.11223E-Ol 0.10962E-Ol 0.77011E-Ol
X4 0.27221E-Ol 0.76852E-02 -0.38179 2.8813
CONSTANT-0.11686E-OI-0.15426 0.71001 -7.2334 20.603
Xl X2 X3 X4 CONSTANT
CORRELATION MATRIX OF COEFFICIENTS
Xl 1.0000
X2 -0.18793 1.0000
X3 -0.55024 0.36221 1.0000
X4 0.21818 0.41514E-Ol -0.81050 1.0000
CONSTANT -0.35027E-0 I -0.31162 0.56368 -0.93883 1.0000
XI X2 X3 X4 CONSTANT
BS. OBSERVED PREDICTED CALCULATED
\lOo VALUE VALUE RESIDUAL
1 2.4420 2.3949 0.47056E-Ol I *
2 2.2040 2.2554 -0.51428E-Ol * I
3 2.2810 2.3116 -0.30551E-0 1 * I
4 2.3650 2.4009 -0.35856E-01 * I
5 2.6660 2.5668 0.99184E-01 *
6 2.3560 2.3442 0.11784E-01 1*
7 2.3870 2.3600 0.27010E-Ol I *
8 2.2560 2.3247 -0.68690E-0 1 * I
9 2.2840 2.3770 -0.92997E-0 1 * I
10 2.3130 2.2284 0.84580E-01 I *
11 2.3280 2.2790 0.49044E-Ol I *
12 2.2430 2.2923 -0.49345E-0 1 * I
13 2.4000 2.3972 0.28271E-02 *
14 2.3050 2.2753 0.29748E-01 I *
15 2.3930 2.3450 0.47995E-Ol I *
16 2.2970 2.3416 -0.44565E-0 1 * I
17 2.4200 2.4379 -0.17945E-0 1 * I
18 2.2980 2.2981 -0.13021E-03 *
19 2.3870 2.3886 -0.16054E-02 *
20 2.2990 2.3262 -0.27198E-01 * I
21 2.3470 2.3924 -0.45429E-0 1 * I
22 2.2440 2.1775 0.6651 OE-O 1 I *
fRBIN-WATSON = 2.0650 VON NEUMANN RATIO = 2.1633 RHO = -0.09978
SIDUAL SUM = -0.84377E-14 RESIDUAL VARIANCE = 0.32870E-02
M OF ABSOLUTE ERRORS= 0.93148
;QUARE BETWEEN OBSERVED AND PREDICTED = 0.7104
NS TEST: 9 RUNS, 10 POS, 0 ZERO, 12 NEG NORMAL STATISTIC = -1.2822
EFFICIENT OF SKEWNESS = 0.2244 WITH STANDARD DEVIATION OF 0.4910
EFFICIENT OF EXCESS KURTOSIS = -0.7393 WITH STANDARD DEVIATION OF 0.9528
~QUE-BERANORMALITY TEST- CHI-SQUARE(2 DF)= 0.8106 P-VALUE= 0.667
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS - 10 GROUPS
SERVED 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 0.0
PECTED 0.2 0.6 1.7 3.5 5.0 5.0 3.5 1.7 0.6 0.2
I-SQUARE = 3.9737 WITH 3 DEGREES OF FREEDOM, P-VALUE= 0.264
rop
FILE INPUT SIPHOA.IN
NIT 80 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: SIPHOA.IN
SAMPLE 1 21
* Y = PUBSIZ
* Xl = FISCOL
* X2 = FISDEC
* X3 = PERCAP
* X4 = LPOP
READ Y Xl X2 X3 X4 / LIST
5 VARIABLES AND 21 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OSS
y Xl X2 X3 X4
·0.2370000 0.2960000 0.1020000
O. 7700000E-0 1 -0.1150000 -0.7000000E-0 1
0.8400000E-0 1 -0.1160000 -0.2850000 .
0.3010000 -0.3700000 0.9000000E-02
·0.3100000 0.5360000 -0.4200000E-0 1
0.3200000E-0 1 -0.1890000 0.3420000
·0.1320000 0.2170000 -0.2150000
0.2800000E-0 1 -0.91 OOOOOE-O 1 0.3700000E-0 1
0.2900000E-0 1 0.4510000 -0.1570000
0.1500000E-0 1 -0.2360000 0.3730000
·0.8500000E-0 1 0.1280000 -0.2790000
0.1570000 -0.1230000 -0.1690000
·0.9500000E-0 1 0.2780000 0.4700000E-0 1
0.8800000E-0 1 -0.1870000 0.1320000
·0.9600000E-0 1 0.6200000E-0 1 -0.1730000
0.1230000 -0.2120000 -0.4900000E-Ol
·0.1220000 0.3070000 -0.3000000E-02
0.8800000E-0 1 -0.2830000 0.81 OOOOOE-O 1
·0.8700000E-0 1 0.1460000 -0.8900000E-0 1
0.4700000E-0 1 -0.1580000 -0.11 OOOOOE-O 1
·0.1020000 0.4540000 0.5900000E-0 1











































:EQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 3 CURRENT PAR= 2000
JLS ESTIMATION
210BSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Y
.NOTE..SAMPLE RANGE SET TO: 1, 21
~-SQUARE = 0.721\ R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6514
rARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.67994E-02
TANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.82459E-0 I
UM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 0.10879
1EAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = -0.93810E-02
OG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 25.4622
10DEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE JUDGE ET AL. (1985,P.242)
\KAIKE (1969) FINAL PREDICTION ERROR - FPE = 0.84183 E-02
(FPE IS ALSO KNOWN AS AMEMIYA PREDICTION CRITERION - PC)
\KAIKE (1973) INFORMATION CRITERION - LOG AIC = -4.7867
;CHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - LOG SC = -4.5380
10DEL SELECTION TESTS - SEE RAMANATHAN (I992,P.I67)
:RAVEN-WAHBA (1979)
GENERALIZED CROSS VALIDATION - GCV = 0.89243 E-02
~ANNAN AND QUINN (1979) CRITERION = 0.88028E-02
:UCE (1984) CRITERION = 0.98901 E-02
;HIBATA (1981) CRITERION = 0.76474E-02
;CHWARZ (1978) CRITERION - SC = 0.I0695E-OI
I\KAIKE (1974) INFORMATION CRITERION :- AIC = 0.83403 E-02
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - FROM MEAN
SS DF MS
~GRESSION 0.28131 4. 0.70328E-0 I
:RROR 0.10879 16. 0.67994E-02
'OTAL 0.39010 20. 0.19505E-Ol
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - FROM ZERO
SS DF MS
~GRESSION 0.28316 . 5. 0.56632E':01
~RROR 0.10879 16. 0.67994E-02









lARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO P-VALUE PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 16 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
U -0.42271 0.7300E-Ol -5.790 0.000 -0.823 -0.8228 1.7059
~2 -0.81123E-Ol 0.1241 -0.6536 0.523 -0.161 -0.1004 -0.1482
~3 2.7084 2.430 1.114 0.282 0.268 0.1976 -6.2279
~4 3.4784 9.204 0.3779 0.710 0.094 0.0608 -1.3319
:ONSTANT -0.65686E-Ol 0.7816E-OI -0.8404 0.413 -0.206 0.0000 7.0021
rARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX OF COEFFICIENTS
:1 0.53293E-02
:2 0.31410E-020.15407E-01
:3 0.4731 OE-O 1 0.13366 5.9065
:4 0.10056 0.19967 12.614 84.716
:ONSTANT -0.15297E-02 -0.34553E-02 -0.17222 -0.57678 0.61092E-02
XI X2 X3 X4 CONSTANT
'ORRELATION MATRIX OF COEFFICIENTS
I 1.0000
2 0.34664 1.0000
3 0.26665 0,44309 1.0000
4 0.14966 0.17477 0.56390 1.0000
ONSTANT -0.26808 -0.35615 -0.90662 -0.80174 1.0000
Xl X2 X3 X4 CONSTANT
OBS. OBSERVED PREDICTED CALCULATED
NO. VALUE VALUE RESIDUAL
1 -0.23700 -0.12267 -0.11433 *
2 0.77000E-0 I 0,44187E-Ol 0.32813E-Ol 1*
3 0.84000E-0 I 0.67299E-0 1 0.16701 E-O 1 1*
4 0.30 I00 0.21304 0.87960E-0 I 1 *
5 -0.31000 -0.21466 -0.95345E-0 1 * 1
6 0.32000E-0 1 0.34377E-0 1 -0.23771 E-02 *
7 -0.13200 -0.47020E-0 1 -0.84980E-0 1 * 1
8 0.28000E-0 1 0.55443E-0 1 -0.27443E-0 1 * I
9 0.29000E-0 1 -0.16606 0.19506 *
10 0.1 5000E-0 1 0.48854E-0 1 -0.33854E-0 1 * I
11 -0.85000E-0 1 0.20451 E-02 -0.87045E-0 1 * I
12 0.15700 0.11006 0.46944E-0 1 I *
13 -0.95000E-0 1 -0.12884 0.33836E-Ol I *
14 0.88000E-0 1 0.58525E-0 1 0.29475E-0 I 1*
15 -0.96000E-0 I -0.31690E-0 1 -0.6431 OE-O 1 * I
16 0.12300 0.12225 0.75204E-03 *
17 -0.12200 -0. 136 I8 0.14185E-Ol I*
18 0.88000E-0 1 0.88139E-Ol -0.13879E-03 *
19 -0.87000E-0 1 -0.76845E-Ol -0.10155E-Ol *1
20 0.47000E-0 1 0.93943E-Ol -0.46943E-0 1 * I
21 -0.10200 -0.21120 0.10920 I *
)URBIN-WATSON = 2.2198 VON NEUMANN RATIO = 2.3308 RHO = -0.25245
~SIDUAL SUM = 0.13878E-16 RESIDUAL VARIANCE = 0.67994E-02
:UM OF ABSOLUTE ERRORS= 1.1338
~-SQUARE BETWEEN OBSERVED AND PREDICTED = 0.7211
~UNS TEST: 10 RUNS, 10 POS, 0 ZERO, 11 NEG NORMAL STATISTIC = -0.6626
:OEFFICIENT OF SKEWNESS = 0.7645 WITH STANDARD DEVIATION OF 0.5012
:OEFFICIENT OF EXCESS KURTOSIS = 1.1588 WITH STANDARD DEVIATION OF 0.9719
ARQUE-BERA NORMALITY TEST- CHI-SQUARE(2 DF)= 2.1034 P-VALUE= 0.349
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS - 10 GROUPS
)BSERVED 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 6.0 7.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
:XPECTED 0.2 0.6 1.7 3.3 4.7 4.7 3.3 1.7 0.6 0.2




[T 80 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: sipho10.in
~LE 122
jAD Xl X2 X3 X4 / LIST
VARIABLES AND 22 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
Xl X2 X3 X4
188000 2.651000 9.072000 3.671200
484000 2.753000 9.095000 3.675300
369000 2.683000 9.110000 3.679600
253000 2.398000 9.126000 3.684600
883000 2.406000 9.165000 3.689600
419000 2.364000 9.186000 3.694600
230000 2.707000 9.197000 3.699800
447000 2.492000 9.231000 3.700100
356000 2.529000 9.262000 3.700600
807000 2.372000 9.290000 3.701100
570000 2.745000 9.306000 3.701500
698000 2.466000 9.342000 3.702000
575000 2.298000 9.382000 3.702500
853000 2.345000 9.400000 3.705200
666000 2.476000 9.419000 3.705700
729000 2.304000 9.432000 3.709700
517000 2.254000 9.459000 3.715800
824000 2.251000 9.473000 3.721800
541000 2.332000 9.479000 3.728100
687000 2.242000 9.487000 3.734300
529000 2.231000 9.513000 3.740500
983000 2.291000 9.524000 3.746700









)LS Y Xl X2 X3 X4 / COEF=BOLS:# STDERR=STDOLS:#
'J"DO
*** EXECUTION BEGINNING FOR DO LOOP # = 1





[AT BOLS / MEAN=B STDEV=ASE
ME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
OTE...TREATING COLUMNS OF BOLS AS VECTORS .
LS 10000 -0.46013 1.8940 3.5874 -7.5130 6.0728
LS 10000 -0.16583 2.6504 7.0246 -9.0935 10.879
LS 10000 0.86841 18.303 335.02 -78.533 71.087
LS 10000 -4.5504 105.76 11184. -401.42 447.95
LS 10000 13 .149 241.04 58098. -939.52 866.97
LS 10000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
rAT STDOLS / MEAN=ESE STDEV=STDSE
ME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
OTE...TREATING COLUMNS OF STDOLS AS VECTORS
)OLS 10000 1.7710 0.57189 0.32706 0.19369 4.3721
)OLS 10000 2.4928 0.80498 0.64800 0.27264 6.1541
)OLS 10000 17.305 5.5882 31.228 1.8927 42.721
)OLS 10000 100.45 32.437 1052.2 10.986 247.98
)OLS 10000 229.65 74.158 5499.4 25.117 566.93




:liNT BASE ESE T STDSE / FORMAT
B ASE ESE T STnSE
·6 1.89 1.77 -0.26· 0.57
7 2.65 ·2.49 ~0.07 0.80
7 18.30 17.30 0.05 5.59
;5 105.76 100.45 -0.05 32.44
l5 241.04 229.65 0.06 74.16
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B is the average parameter estimate
£\SE is the standard deviation of the parameter estimate
ESE is the average standard error
: VALUES




IT 80 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: sipho15.in
t\MPLE 1 22
EAD Xl X2 X3 X4 / LIST
VARIABLES AND 22 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
Xl X2 X3 X4
.188000 2.651000 9.072000 3.671200
.484000 2.753000 9.095000 3.675300
.3 69000 2.683000 9.110000 3.679600
.253000 2.398000 9.126000 3.684600
.883000 2.406000 9.165000 3.689600
.419000 2.364000 9.186000 3.694600
.230000 2.707000 9.197000 3.699800
.447000 2.492000 9.231000 3.700100
.356000 2.529000 9.262000 3.700600
.807000 2.372000 9.290000 3.701100
.570000 2.745000 9.306000 3.701500
.698000 . 2.466000 9.342000 3.702000
.575000 2.298000 9.382000 3.702500
.853000 2.345000 9.400000 3.705200
.666000 2.476000 9.419000 3.705700
.729000 2.304000 9.432000 3.709700
.517000 2.254000 9.459000 3.715800
.824000 2.251000 9.473000 3.721800
.541000 2.332000 9.479000 3.728100
.687000 2.242000 9.487000 3.734300
.529000 2.231000 9.513000 3.740500
.983000 2.291000 9.524000 3.746700









)LS Y Xl X2 X3 X4/ COEF=BOLS:# STDERR=STDOLS:#
IDO
*** EXECUTION BEGINNING FOR DO LOOP # = 1




I STAT BOLS I MEAN=B STDEV=ASE
NAME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
...NOTE.. .TREATING COLUMNS OF BOLS AS VECTORS
BOLS 10000 -0.41986 1.5740 2.4776 -6.5139 5.2451
BOLS 10000 -0.15566 1.9526 3.8126 -7.3374 6.8902
BOLS 10000 0.74642 6.7668 45.789 -23.893 29.277
BOLS 10000 -3.6931 55.807 3114.5 -234.91 189.50
BOLS 10000 10.941 159.40 25407. -544.61 622.20
BOLS 10000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
I STATSTDOLS/MEAN=ESESTDEV=STDSE
NAME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
...NOTE.. .TREATING COLUMNS OF STDOLS AS VECTORS
STDOLS 10000 1.5344 0.34895 0.12177 0.41911 2.9621
STDOLS 10000 1.9137 0.43521 0.18941 0.52272 3.6943
STDOLS 10000 6.5570 1.4912 2.2236 1.7910 12.658
STDOLS 10000 54.217 12.330 152.03 14.809 104.66
STDOLS 10000 154.89 35.225 1240.8 42.307 299.00




I PRINT BASE ESE T STDSE I FORMAT
B ASE ESE T STDSE
-0.42 1.57 1.53 -0.27 0.35
-0.16 1.95 1.91 -0.08 0.44
0.75 6.77 6.56 0~11 1.49
-3.69 55.81 54.22 -0.07 12.33
10.94 159.401 154.89 0.07 35.22
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
L* B is the average parameter estimate
1_* ASE is the standard deviation of the parameter estimate
1_* ESE is the average standard error
1_* t VALUES=B/ESE




HT 80 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: sipho221.in
:AMPLE 122
~AD Xl X2 X3 X4 / LIST






































































































)OLS Y Xl X2 X3 X4 / COEF=BOLS:# STDERR=STDOLS:#
~NDO
**** EXECUTION BEGINNING FOR DO LOOP # = 1




TAT BOLS / MEAN=B STDEV=ASE
.ME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
rOTE...TREATING COLUMNS OF BOLS AS VECTORS
ILS 10000-0.41772 1.2820 1.6436 -4.9112 4.4490
ILS 10000 -0.17227 1.9143 3.6644 -7.6421 6.6114
ILS 10000 0.64691 4.8588 23.608 -17.219 21.877
ILS 10000 -2.9328 29.757 885.48 -115.62 106.84
ILS 10000 9.1422 79.430 6309.1 -300.65 313.54
ILS 10000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000







ME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM
JOTE...TREATING COLUMNS OF STDOLS As VECTORS
DOLS 10000 1.2639 0.21679 0.47000E-01 0.53104
DOLS 10000 1.8754 0.32168 0.10348 0.78795
DOLS 10000 4.7719 0.81852 0.66997 2.0050
DOLS 10000 29.189 5.0067 25.067 12.264
DOLS 10000 78.051 13.388 179.23 32.794




RINT BASE ESE T STDSE / FORMAT
B ASE ESE T STDSE
1.42 1.28 1.26 -0.33 0.22
1.17 1.91 ·1.88 -0.09 0.32
1.65 4.86 4.77 0.14 0.82
.93 29.76 29.19 -0.10 5.01
14 79.43 78.05 0.12 13.39
00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MAXIMUM
B is the average parameter estimate
ASE is the standard deviation of the parameter estimate
ESE is the average standard error
t VALUES = B/ESE
STnSE is the standard deviation of the standard errors
TOP
OBSERVATIONS
:LE INPUT SIPH060 1.IN















)LS Y Xl X2 X3 X4 / COEF=BOLS:# STDERR=STDOLS:#
®O
*** EXECUTION BEGINNING FOR DO LOOP # = 1




['AT BOLS / MEAN=B STDEV=ASE
ME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
OTE...TREATING COLUMNS OF BOLS AS VECTORS
LS 10000 -0.41608 0.54834 0.30068 -2.4448 1.7135
:"S 10000 -0.15314 0.85285 0.72736 -3.1650 3.0690
:"S 10000 0.68751 0.86780 0.75307 -2.4541 4.1027
:"S 10000 -3.3338 6.1002 37.212 -27.556 18.777
:"S 10000 10.201 25.532 651.90 -80.551 109.73
~S 10000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
~AT STDOLS / MEAN=ESE STDEV=STDSE
\.1E N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
JTE. ..TREATING COLUMNS OF STDOLS AS VECTORS
IOLS 10000 0.54572 0.51549E-010.26573E-02 0.34998 0.74260
tOLS 10000 0.85607 0.80865E-01 0.65391E-02 0.54901 1.1649
tOLS 10000 0.87230 0.82397E-010.67893E-02 0.55941 1.1870
IOLS 10000 6.1301 0.57905 0.33529 3.9313 8.3415
IOLS 10000 25.690 2.4267 5.8886 16.475 34.958




INT BASE ESE T STDSE / FORMAT
B ASE ESE T STDSE
.42 0.55 0.55 -0.76 0.05
.15 0.85 0.86 -0.18 0.08
,69 0.87 0.87 0.79 0.08
33 6.10 6.13 -0.54 0.58
20 25.53 25.69 0.40 2.43
00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B is the average parameter estimate
ASE is the standard deviation of the parameter estimate
ESE is the average standard error
t VALUES = B/ESE



















JLS Y Xl X2 X3 X4 / COEF=BOLS:# STDERR=STDOLS:#
NDO
'*** EXECUTION BEGINNING FOR DO LOOP # = 1




TAT BOLS / MEAN=B STDEV=ASE
ME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
rOTE...TREATING COLUMNS OF BOLS AS VECTORS
LS 10000 -0.42735 0.48389 0.23415 -2.1242 1.3690
LS 10000-0.15921 0.64964 0.42204 -2.6046 2.1782
LS 10000 0.68962 0.76651 0.58753 -2.3928 3.5053
LS 10000 -3.3437 4.9357 24.361 -21.728 14.602
LS 10000 10.270 20.373 415.04 -58.455 82.462
LS 10000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
rAT STDOLS / MEAN=ESE STDEV=STDSE
ME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM
OTE...TREATING COLUMNS OF STDOLS AS VECTORS
)OLS 10000 0.48154 0.34902E-OI0.12182E-02 0.35249 0.62167
)OLS 10000 0.65113 0.47194E-010.22273E-02 0.47664 0.84062
)OLS 10000 0.77302 0.56029E-Ol 0.31393E-02 0.56587 0.99798
)OLS 10000 4.9310 0.35740 0.12774 3.6096 6.3660
)OLS 10000 20.350 1.4750 2.1757 14.897 26.273




~T BASE ESE T STDSE / FORMAT
B ASE ESE T STDSE
1.43 0.48 0.48 -0.89 0.03
1.16 0.65 0.65 -0.24 0.05
'.69 0.77 0.77 0.89 0.06
.34 4.94 4.93 -0.68 0.36
27 20.37 20.35 0.50 1.48
00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B is the average parameter estimate
ASE is the standard deviation of the parameter estimate
ESE is the average standard error
t VALUES=BIESE
STDSE is the standard deviation of the standard errors
rop
AnnexureE
SOUTH AFRICA· SELECTED INDICATORS.
FINANCIAL QUATER CONSOLIDATED TRANSFERS SUBNATIONAL GROSS POPULATION
YEAR. GENERAL TO GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC (MILLION)
GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL OWN SOURCE PRODUCT
EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENTS REVENUE
ROOO ROOO ROOO ROOO
199394 1 39316 9532 5570 342101 39.30
2 31868 10389 5001 351627 39.46
3 35078 10191 5131 358328 39.63
4 38952 10073 4284 366000 39.83
1994/95 1 55004 9829 6102 382498 40.03
2 41047 12642 4405 392706 40.23
3 43452 10987 6510 399164 40.44
4 39406 12378 4761 412915 40.45
1995/96 1 41855 11998 5247 426283 40.47
2 44334 19948 4751 412915 40.49
3 45735 16247 7118 445757 40.51
4 43558 17584 5130 462247 40.53
1996/97 1 53082 18955 5282 481340 40.55
2 49268 23229 5138 491304 40.66
3 54893 21471 6532 501337 40.68
4 50686 21103 5074 509617 40.84
1997/98 1 59254 19965 5646 5267~6 41.09
2 53518 24508 5082 537404 41.34
3 59219 20433 6096 544481 41.60
4 55040 21979 5183 552169 41.86
1998/99 1 59600 20313 5551 570337 42.12
2 54733 29376 5410 580104 4238
